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THE HANDICAPPED AND MASS
TRANSPORTATION: THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SECTION 504 IN
IMPLEMENTING EQUAL ACCESS
I. Introduction
On September 19, 1980, the board of directors of the Metropoli-
tan Transportation Authority of the City of New York ("MTA"),
in an unprecedented move, voted not to comply with federal regu-
lations requiring mass transit systems to be made accessible to the
handicapped.' After conducting a cost-benefit analysis, MTA con-
cluded that compliance would be too expensive - $1.5 billion ini-
tially - while annual federal subsidies potentially to be forfeited
were only one-third this sum, approximately $435 million.' The
MTA subsequently reversed its position and applied to the De-
partment of Transportation ("DOT") for a six-month extension
period to submit a plan of compliance.8
The regulations involved' were promulgated by DOT under the
authority of three statutes: section 16(a) of the Urban Mass Trans-
portation Act of 1964,' section 165(b) of the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1973," and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.7 In
1970, the first of these statutes to advance the rights of the handi-
capped to use mass transportation, the Urban Mass Transporta-
tion ("UMT") Act, declared it to be the "national policy that eld-
erly and handicapped persons have the same right as other
persons" to use mass transportation facilities and services and re-
1. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, at Al, col. 4. The regulations were issued by the Depart-
ment of Transportation ("DOT") requiring recipients of federal funds to submit a plan to
make mass transportation accessible to the handicapped. 49 C.F.R. § 27.103 (1980).
2. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, at Al, col. 4.
3. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, at A33, col. 1. In fact, MTA had already drafted a plan of
compliance which it subsequently submitted to the DOT on December 31, 1980. New York
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Draft Section 504 Transition Plan for Handi-
capped Accessibility (Sept. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Transition Plan]. See also Letter
from Richard Ravitch, Chairman of MTA, to Neil Goldschmidt, Secretary of Transportation
(Dec. 31, 1980), reprinted in Transition Plan, supra.
4. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.81-.107 (1980).
5. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1976).
6. 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
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quired "special efforts" in the planning and design of accessible
facilities.' Three years later, Congress passed the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1973 which required mass transportation funded
by the federal government to be designed to be effectively utilized
by the elderly or handicapped who would be unable to use such
services unless special facilities were designed.' The act was later
amended to make the rights of the handicapped to accessible mass
transportation even more explicit: projects must not only be
planned and designed for effective use, but also constructed and
operated to allow for effective use by the handicapped, including
the non-ambulatory wheelchair bound.' 0 The last in this series
of protective statutes, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("sec-
tion 504"), contained a general clause prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped by recipients of federal funds."
Section 504 has had a dramatic, if short, history and has pro-
vided the foundation for a number of suits by the handicapped
seeking enforcement of their civil rights. 2 Section II of this Com-
ment discusses the legislative history of section 504, while Section
III describes the enforcement problems courts and administrative
agencies have encountered. Section IV summarizes the agency
rules implementing the statute. Section V of this Comment then
examines the MTA's study which led to its initial refusal to com-
ply with federal rules and compares the transit authority's findings
with a study conducted by a coalition of handicapped groups. Fi-
nally, section VI briefly discusses alternative avenues under New
York state law through which the handicapped can assert their
right to equal access to mass transportation for the handicapped"
in view of the increasing reluctance of the judiciary and legislature
8. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1976).
9. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-87, § 165(b), 87 Stat. 282 (1973)
(codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976)).
10. Federal-Aid Highway Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105(b), 88 Stat.
2283 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976)).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
12. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979) (deaf stu-
dent sought admission to nursing school); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277
(7th Cir. 1977) (handicapped group sought access to mass transportation); Drennon v. Phila-
delphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (epileptic denied employment as hos-
pital technician).
13. Constitutional arguments of equal protection for the handicapped are beyond the
scope of this Comment. See note 265 infra and accompanying text.
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in enforcing section 504.
II. Legislative History
Section 504 provides: "No otherwise qualified handicapped indi-
vidual in the United States. . .shall, solely by reason of his hand-
icap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance."14 The plain language of the
statute indicates Congress' desire to ensure that federally assisted
programs not discriminate solely on the basis of a handicap. De-
spite the seeming simplicity of this provision, however, it has
proven difficult for courts and administrative agencies to ascertain
the scope of statutory protection and to provide enforcement. 1 As
a result, many of the handicapped fear that section 504 may be-
come, in the words of one commentator, a "symbolic law" - a law
without sufficient enforcement power."0 A consideration of the leg-
islative history of section 504 requires two lines of inquiry: first,
the background of the Rehabilitation Act as a whole and, second,
the drafting of the specific section's language. While these queries
are distinct, together they suggest the scope of the section's
protection.
Clearly, the historical emphasis of the Rehabilitation Act has
been on vocational rehabilitation. Its genesis was the 1920 Smith-
Fess Act7 which provided the disabled with job training, counsel-
ing, and placement. 8 Major amendments to this act were passed
between 1943 and 1968 which enlarged the act's scope and effec-
tiveness by: 1) providing for medical services; 2) expanding the
class of beneficiaries to include the mentally ill and mentally re-
tarded; 3) establishing research and rehabilitation programs; and
4) increasing federal financial support.1' In 1972 Congress again
14. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976).
15. See 41 Fed. Reg. 20296 (1976).
16. Achtenberg, "Crips" Unite to Enforce Symbolic Laws: Legal Aid for the Disabled:
An Overview, 4 U. SAN FERN. V. L. REv. 161 (1975) [hereinafter cited as "Crips" Unite].
17. Smith-Fess Act, Pub. L. No. 66-236, 41 Stat. 755 (1920). See S. REP. No. 318, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2076, 2082 [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 3181.
18. S. RaP. No. 318, supra note 17, at 9, [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2082.
19. S. REP. No. 318, supra note 17, at 9-11, [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2082-
84.
1981]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
sought to extend this program, then called the Vocational Rehabil-
itation Act, by unanimously passing a far-reaching amendment
which contained a provision, later known as "section 504," barring
discrimination against "otherwise qualified" handicapped individu-
als in programs receiving federal financial assistance2 0 Despite
overwhelming bipartisan Congressional approval of the statute,
President Nixon twice vetoed the legislation as "fiscally irresponsi-
ble," though neither veto message criticized the anti-discrimina-
tion measure in particular.2 " With further budget cuts mandated
by the President, the Rehabilitation Act was finally enacted on
September 26, 1973.22 Two factors in the legislative history of the
Rehabilitation Act indicate Congress' intent to confer broad rights
on the handicapped. First, the title of the legislation was changed
to exclude the adjective "vocational."2 Second, Congress' desire to
expand the scope of the act's protection led to a 1974 amendment
which redefined "handicapped" to eliminate reference to voca-
tional goals.24
20. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6373, 6390 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1297].
The Senate version contained this anti-discrimination language, but the House version
had no comparable provision. The measure was, however, adopted by the Conference Com-
mittee. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conferees, Hearings on S.7.
Before the Subcommittee on the Handicapped of the Committee on Labor and Public Wel-
fare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 196 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S.7J.
21. See Memo of Veto to H.R. 8395, October 27, 1972, reprinted in Hearings on S.7,
supra note 20, at 198. See also Memo of Veto to S.7, March 27, 1973, reprinted in [1973]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 2088-90.
22. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 25, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD NEws at 6376.
23. As an accompanying Senate report explained, this modification expressed the "new
thrust of the bill .... While the Committee expects and mandates . . .that the program
will remain vocationally oriented, it does believe that ... [severely] handicapped individu-
als ... [who] may never achieve employment ... should not be denied services." S. REP.
No. 318, supra note 17, at 19, [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2092. Nevertheless,
even the most recent complaints under the Rehabilitation Act stress loss of potential em-
ployment in the pleadings. See, e.g., Dopico v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-4562, 13-14 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Aug. 7, 1980); Disabled in Action v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-1862, 13-16 (S.D.N.Y. filed
Aug. 21, 1980).
24. "Handicapped individual," as originally defined, included
any individual who (A) has a physical or mental disability which for such individual
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment and (B) can reasona-
bly be expected to benefit in terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation
services provided pursuant to ... this chapter.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 361 (1973). The 1974 definition
included the 1973 language and added the following:
898 [Vol. IX
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The second aspect of the history of section 504 concerns the
origins of its specific language. Explicitly patterned after the anti-
discrimination language of section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, the wording of section 504 demonstrates Congress' intent to
similarly prohibit discrimination against the handicapped.25  In
fact, section 504 was the final result of earlier attempts to amend
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act itself to include such a provision to
protect the handicapped 2 6 Despite section 504's close relationship
with the Civil Rights Act, courts have been reluctant to afford as
extensive protection to the handicapped suing under the Rehabili-
tation Act, especially to those desiring equal access to mass trans-
portation, as they have given to those seeking protection under the
Civil Rights Act.17 Rather, questions have been raised which center
upon the methods - indeed, the propriety - of enforcing the pro-
any person who (A) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
one or more of such person's major life activities, (B) has a record of such an impair-
ment, of (C) is regarded as having such an impairment.
Rehabilitation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-516. 88 Stat. 1619 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)
(1976)). In the words of a Senate report: "Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination
against all handicaped individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from,
vocational rehabilitation services, in relation to Federal assistance in employment, housing,
transportation, education, health services, or any other Federally-aided programs." S. REP.
No. 1297, supra note 20, at 38, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6388.
25. S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 39, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6390.
The Civil Rights Act provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrmination under any program or activity receiving any Federal financial
assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
26. During the 92d Congress, Representative Charles Vanik introduced H.R. 12154. 117
CONG. REc. 45974-75 (1971). An identical bill was introduced in the Senate by Senators
Hubert Humphrey and Charles Percy. 118 CONG. REc. 525-26 (1972). The bills prohibited
discrimination "unless lack of such physical or mental handicap is a bona fide qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of such program or activity." In these bills, a
handicap was not defined in reference to vocation. Id. at 526. As Congressman Vanik noted
in the floor debates on the Rehabilitation Act of 1973:
In December of 1971 I introduced a bill that incorporated the handicapped into the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Regardless of the fact that 60 Members of the House and 20
Members of the Senate cosponsored the civil rights bill, it was not reported to the
floor by either Judiciary Committee.
Senator Humphrey who introduced my bill in the Senate, incorporated the lan-
guage and intent of my bill into the Vocational Rehabilitation Act last year in the
Senate.
I am happy to say that my language remains in . ..today's bill.
119 CONG. REc. 7114 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Vanik).
27. See generally "Crips" Unite, supra note 16, at 190-91 n.107, 194-95 n.120.
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visions of section 504.2
III. Enforcement of Section 504: The Developing
Standards
Following the enactment of section 504 in 1973, administrative
implementation and judicial interpretation of its provisions were
inextricably linked in the development af enforcement standards.
The process was slow, due in part to the fact that section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, unlike section 601 of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, did not contain its own rulemaking authority.2 '
In the absence of legislative specification of a form of administra-
tion, a handicapped group brought suit in Cherry v. Mathews,30 to
compel the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare ("HEW") to issue standards governing recipients of HEW
funds.," Defendants argued that the statute imposed no explicit
duty to issue regulations; the court, however, rejected their argu-
ment because
the plain meaning doctrine does not preclude consideration of legislative
history when necessary to ascertain and effectuate an underlying congres-
sional purpose.. . . The statute's discrimination prohibitions were certainly
not intended to be self-executing. Reports from the Senate and the House
on the 1974 Amendments to the Act indicate that Congress contemplated
swift implementation of § 504 through a comprehensive set of regulations.2
As a result of the suit, HEW began the rulemaking process, but its
final rule implementing section 504 was not given effect until June
3, 1977,," nearly a year after the Cherry decision.
28. See generally cases cited in notes 36-43 infra.
29.'41 Fed. Reg. 20296 (1976). The enforcement mechanism of the anti-discrimination
clause of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is contained within the statute. 42 U.S.C.
V§ 2000d-1 (1976). It directs each federal department empowered to extend federal financial
assistance to issue its own rules and regulations "consistent with achievement of the objec-
tives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action
is taken." Id. The rules were then to be approved by the President. Id.
30. 419 F. Supp. 922, 924 n.2 (D.D.C. 1976).
31. Id. at 923.
32. Id. at 924 (citations omitted).
33. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977). Section 504 enforcement powers are now vested in the
Department of Justice. 45 Fed. Reg. 37620 (1980) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.501-.540
(1980)). The Justice Department intended its final rule to be consistent with the HEW rule.
Id. This Comment will, therefore, refer to the rule as "HEW's" and will specify distinctions
only where the rules differ significantly.
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Further delay in developing enforcement standards for section
504 was caused by HEW's decision to implement separately from
its rulemaking a Presidential mandate which required certain
other enforcement mechanisms.4 Executive Order 11,914 was is-
sued in April, 1976 requiring the Secretary of HEW to coordinate
the implementation of section 504 by all federal departments and
agencies empowered to grant federal financial aid and ensure the
adoption of consistent practices.35 As a result, no coordination or
enforcement among government bodies existed until January 13,
1978, when HEW specified the responsibilities of each federal
agency under section 504." Pursuant to this rule, DOT began to
develop its own guidelines regulating accessibility of mass transit
to the handicapped. Before the department issued its final rule on
May 31, 1979,87 however, Congress amended section 504 to state,
"any proposed regulation shall be submitted to appropriate au-
thorizing committees of the Congress."88
Given this long and continuing delay in providing final imple-
menting regulations, the enforcement of the anti-discrimination
provision of the Rehabilitation Act has proven problematic for the
handicapped especially in the area of mass transit. Great uncer-
tainty as to the scope of the section's protection surrounded early
decisions construing the section" - and, indeed, still exists.40 Ini-
34. 42 Fed. Reg. 22677 (1977).
35. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17871 (1976), reprinted in 29 U.S.C. § 794
(1976). Specifically, HEW was to establish standards for determining who is the protected
handicapped class and create guidelines for determining what would constitute discrimina-
tory practices. Furthermore, under the order, once HEW set up the coordination framework,
each federal department administering federal financial assistance was required to issue
rules consistent with the standards and procedures established by HEW. The order set no
deadlines, however, for accomplishing its directive. Id.
36. 43 Fed. Reg. 2132 (1978).
37. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-.129 (1980).
38. Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I, §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (Supp. II 1978)). See note 120 infra and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394
(N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977);'Bartels v. Biernat, 405
F. Supp. 1012 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
40. See, e.g., American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C.
1980) (DOT rules challenged as arbitrary and in excess of statutory authority); Atlantis
Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Col. 1978) ("the federal statutes
[UMT Act and section 504] do not provide a sufficient definition of the duties of the federal
defendants to enable this court to give direction to them"). "
1981]
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tially, defendants to suits brought by handicapped groups argued,
as did the HEW in Cherry, that the legislation merely expressed
Congressional policy and was not intended to create legal duties.4 1
While courts have resolved this issue in favor of the handicapped,
recipients of federal funds typically have raised the following de-
fenses, inter alia: first, the only duty imposed by section 504 is a
duty not to discriminate by active exclusion, but no affirmative ac-
tion is required;' 2 second, the section did not confer a private right
of action because the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative rem-
edies applied to bar judicial scrutiny,'8 third, compliance was too
costly;" and, finally, compliance was impossible due to technologi-
cal restraints.' 5 Recently, transit authorities have challenged DOT
implementing rules as illegal, in excess of statutory authority, pro-
cedurally defective, and arbitrary and capricious.' 6
A. Affirmative Rights and a Private Cause of Action: An
Early View
Even before the implementation of specific regulations by HEW
and DOT, the Seventh Circuit in Lloyd v. Regional Transporta-
tion Authority,'47 conferred significant enforcement rights under
section 504 to the handicapped. In Lloyd, a class action was
brought by a group of handicapped individuals alleging their pre-
sent inability to use the Chicago mass transit system and claiming
that, unless defendants were compelled to take affirmative action,
inaccessibility would continue.'8 Relying on the similarity in con-
struction between section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and section
41. See Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394, 396
(N.D. Ala. 1975). See also "Crips" Unite, supra note 16, at 190, 191 n.107.
42. See, e.g., Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 404 (1979); United
Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297, 1301 (D. Minn. 1976), vacated, 558 F.2d
413 (8th Cir. 1977). See also text accompanying notes 52-57 infra.
43. See, e.g., Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 865 (2d Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional
Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1284-88 (7th Cir. 1977); Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. 1012,
1015-16 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
44. See, e.g., Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W.Va. 1976).
45. See, e.g., Snowden v. Birmingham-Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394,
398.
46. American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811, 821 (D.D.C. 1980).
47. 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977).
48. Id. at 1279.
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601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,"1 the Seventh Circuit held that
section 504 conferred affirmative rights to the handicapped, 0 and,
moreover, a private cause of action could be implied to vindicate
those rights because no administrative remedy was then available
to the handicapped plaintiffs in the absence of regulations. 1
In deciding the issue of whether section 504 conferred affirma-
tive rights, the Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Lau v. Nichols.5' In Lau, non-English speaking children of
Chinese descent sought unspecified relief under section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act against a school district which they alleged had
afforded them unequal educational opportunities."3 The Supreme
Court relied, in part, on the HEW guidelines accompanying the
Civil Rights Act: "'Where inability to speak and understand the
English language excludes national origin-minority group children
from effective participation in the educational program .. . the
[school] district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language
deficiency in order to open its instructional program to these stu-
dents.'"" In accepting federal funds, the school district had con-
tractually agreed to comply with the Civil Rights Act and its ac-
companying regulations and was therefore required to remedy the
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). See also notes 25-26 supra and accompanying text.
50. 548 F.2d at 1284.
51. Id. at 1287. In Bartels v. Biernat, a case antedating Lloyd, plaintiff class of mobility
handicapped sought to enjoin a defendant transit authority from purchasing non-accessible
equipment. The court noted it
need not and does not-determine whether a private right of action is created by either
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. . .or [by] § 16(a) of the Urban Mass Trans-
portation Act of 1964. . . . Where equitable relief is sought, as in the case at bar, it
would appear that private plaintiffs with sufficient standing may obtain protection
against harm from federal administrative action even though the only legally pro-
tected interests are those of the public.
Bartels v. Biernat, 405 F. Supp. at 1015-16.
52. 414 U.S. 563 (1974)..
53. Id. at 564. The children filed suit alleging a violation of both section 601 and of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the fourteenth amendment. Id. The Supreme Court, however,
based its decision that the school discriminated against the students solely on statutory
grounds. Id. at 566. The Court noted: "It seems obvious that the Chinese-speaking minority
receives fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority from respondents' school system
which denies them a meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational program -
all earmarks of the discrimination banned by the regulations [implementing the Civil Rights
Act]." Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
54. Id. at 568 (emphasis added) (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970)).
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discriminatory effect of its practices.6 As the Lloyd court noted:
Because of the near identity of language in Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 and Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Lau is
dispositive. Therefore, we hold that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act,
at least when considered with the regulations which now implement it,
establishes affirmative rights. . . .
The Lloyd court also relied upon HEW's own language that the
"'procedural provisions of the title VI [Civil Rights Act] regulation
. . . will be incorporated by reference into the section 504 regula-
tions for use [until it issues final regulations].' 57
In determining whether section 504 conferred a private right of
action, the Lloyd court noted, first, that the Supreme Court in Lau
had permitted the Chinese-speaking students to sue as third party
beneficiaries of the school district's contractual agreement to com-
ply with the Civil Rights Act.58 It then applied the four-prong test
set out by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash:
First . . . does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?.
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, ei-
ther to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the
plaintiff?. And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to
state law, in an area basically the concern of the State, so that it would be
inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?89
The court found that the four-prong Cort test had been satisfied
and that a private cause of action had to be implied.60 First, be-
cause plaintiffs were mobility-handicapped, they fell among the
55. Id. at 568-69.
56. 548 F.2d at 1281 (emphasis added). Accord, Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d
1147, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 1974) (bilingual program ordered for Spanish-surnamed school chil-
dren suing under title VI).
57. 548 F.2d at 1284 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 29548 (1976).
58. Id. at 1280, 1285 n.28 citing Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at 571 n.2).
59. Id. at 1285 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). The Supreme Court has
employed the Cort v. Ash test in a number of instances. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 232 (1979) (private right of action under the fifth amendment to remedy sex dis-
crimination); Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316 (1979) (no cause of action under
Freedom of Information Act to enjoin disclosure of documents); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41 (1977) (no cause of action for damages under Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 against tender offeror by defeated takeover bidder).
60. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Ass'n, 548 F.2d at 1287.
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class to be protected by the statute.' Second, Congress had mani-
fested intent to create a remedy for the handicapped under section
504. A Senate Report accompanying the measure specified that the
provision was consciously "patterned after" section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act: "[it was] clearly mandatory in form, and such regula-
tions and enforcement [as implemented by section 601 were] in-
tended." 2 This remedy had to take in the form of a private cause
of action because no administrative remedy then existed." Third,
it was consistent with the underlying purposes of the scheme to
imply a remedy of a private cause of action because the Rehabilita-
tion Act expressly stated that its purpose was to include the devel-
opment of solutions to existing mass transportation barriers im-
peding the handicapped." As the Lloyd court observed, a private
cause of action would serve to enforce regulatory standards." Fi-
nally, the question of affording private remedies under section 504
was not traditionally relegated to state law because of the impor-
tance of serving the transportation needs of the handicapped on a
national basis.6
B. Scope of Duty
In addition to conferring affirmative rights and providing for a
private right to judicial action under section 504, the Lloyd court
relied on HEW's proposed rules to determine the extent of the af-
firmative duty of federal grant recipients not to discriminate
against the handicapped. The court noted that HEW's proposed
rules required that the handicapped be provided with services "as
effective as [those] provided to others. '67 The proposed rules fur-
61. Id. at 1285.
62. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 39-40, 11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws at 6390). Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976), implied a private cause of action, noting the
similarity in language with Title VI. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 699-703
(1979). Moreover, in De la Cruz v. Tormey, the Ninth Circuit noted that the language in
Title IX which barred sex discrimination was based on Title VI. It therefore implied a pri-
vate cause of action citing Lau as controlling. 582 F.2d 45, 60-61 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 441 U.S. 965 (1979).
63. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Ass'n, 548 F.2d at 1286.
64. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2, 87 Stat. 357 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701(11) (1976)).
65. 548 F.2d at 1286.
66. Id. at 1286-87.
67. Id. at 1283 (quoting 41 Fed. Reg. 29561 (1976)).
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ther stated that grant recipients could not provide different or sep-
arate services to handicapped persons unless necessary to achieve
the goal of "equal efficacy."' HEW cautioned that this standard
was not to be interpreted as mandating "identical result[s] . . . but
must afford handicapped persons equal opportunity to obtain the
same result[s]" as non-handicapped persons.69 Nevertheless, as
noted in Lloyd, "special efforts," that is, "genuine, good-faith pro-
gress, '7 0 in planning services for wheelchair users were required by
the UMT Act whose rules had been recently issued in part under
the authority of section 504.1 UMT Act rules, however, did not
specify a program design to meet the special requirement 2 because
"particular approaches must be determined locally. 7' They in-
stead provided examples illustrating satisfactory levels of effort.7 4
Thus, given the largely undefined standards implementing sec-
tion 504 of "equal efficacy" and "special efforts" which took into
account local needs, courts struggled in evaluating mass transit
programs. Lloyd had relied on the similarity in construction be-
tween section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and section 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 in giving content to the former. Yet, as
HEW itself stated in its notice of intent to issue proposed rules to
section 504, a conceptual difference existed between the two stat-
utes despite the similarity in language. The prohibition against ra-
cial discrimination was premised on the notion that no inherent
differences existed among the races. On the other hand,
[h]andicapped persons may require different treatment in order to be af-
68. 41 Fed. Reg. 29561 (1976).
69. Id.
70. 548 F.2d at 1282 (quoting 23 C.F.R. § 450 app. (1977)). See note 74 infra.
71. 548 F.2d at 1282 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 613.204 (1977)). The authority of the Urban
Mass Transit Act regulations fell under three statutes: the Urban Mass Transportation Act
of 1964, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1612 (1976), Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1976, as
amended, 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976), and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29
U.S.C. § 794 (1974). 41 Fed. Reg. 18234, 18239 (1976).
72. Appendix to 49 C.F.R. Part 613, Subpart B (1977).
73. 41 Fed. Reg. 18234, 18236 (1976).
74. The examples of special efforts were: a program for wheelchair users that will involve
the expenditures of an average annual dollar amount equivalent to a minimum of five per-
cent of funds apportioned to a city with a population greater than 200,000 under 49 U.S.C.§ 1604(b) (1976); purchase of only wheelchair-accessible buses until half the fleet is acces-
sible, or provision of comparable substitute service; and a system assuring every wheelchair
user of 10 round-trips weekly on public transportation at fares comparable to those charged
on standard transit buses. 49 C.F.R. §§ 613.200-.204 app. (1980).
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forded equal access. . . and identical treatment may, in fact, constitute dis-
crimination. The problem of establishing general rules as to when different
treatment is prohibited or required is compounded by the diversity of ex-
isting handicaps and the differing degree to which particular persons may
be affected. Thus, under section 504, questions arise as to when different
treatment of handicapped persons should be considered improper and when
it should be required.
75
Although this HEW comment indicates the practical difficulties of
implementing section 504, it overstated them to the detriment of
the handicapped. Courts could not rely exclusively upon decisions
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act as precedent because, as
HEW noted, different treatment of the handicapped was required
under certain circumstances.7 6 This same situation, however,
existed in Lau v. Nichols,7 the Title VI decision which served as
precedent for Lloyd. In Lau, the Supreme Court noted in dicta
that some kind of different treatment might be required if Chi-
nese-speaking public school children were to be afforded equal ser-
vices-for example, classes conducted in Chinese or special in-
struction in English. 78
HEW later noticeably changed its emphasis on different treat-
ment for the handicapped in response to comment by handicapped
groups concerned that such a provision would render the statute
meaningless. In view of the handicapped, the emphasis was objec-
tionable "both in principle and in practice: in principle, because it
served to perpetuate the view of handicapped persons as 'differ-
ent,' and in practice, because it [could result] . . . in unnecessary
reliance . . . on the use of separate services to meet the require-
ments of the statute. s79 Therefore, in HEW's final rules, "different
or separate services [were to be] prohibited "except when neces-
sary" to provide equally effective benefits."80 Before the issuance
of final rules, however, courts had to make determinations of what
constituted compliance on an ad hoc basis; since their issuance
75. 41 Fed. Reg. 20296 (1976). The difference between sections 504 and 601 is also shown
in the early attempt to amend the Civil Rights Act to include language similar to section
504's. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
76. Id.
77. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
78. Id. at 565.
79. 41 Fed. Reg. 29548, 29550 (1976).
80. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676, 22687 (1977).
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courts have had to struggle with such nebulous standards as when
different treatment might be "necessary.
81
In one of the earliest mass transportation decisions, Bartels v.
Biernat, a group of handicapped individuals brought a class action
suit to enjoin the Milwaukee transit authority from purchasing
buses alleged to be inaccessible to the mobility handicapped.82 The
plaintiffs based their claim in part on section 504, relying also on
the UMT Act."8 Discussing the probability of success on the mer-
its,"' the court observed that, due to the "broad language" of the
two statutes, it was unclear whether the handicapped plaintiffs
could meet this requirement.8 " While the court concluded that the
plaintiffs did not show likelihood'of success on the merits," it nev-
ertheless exercised its equitable powers and granted a preliminary
injunction in view of the balance of hardships and the seriousness
of the issues involved. 7
Two years later, the same court confronted the question of
whether it should issue a permanent injunction. In the interim,
the Urban Mass Transportation Administration ("UMTA") had is-
sued additional regulations governing funding which it con-
trolled.89 Because section 504 served as partial authority for these
regulations,90 as did the UMT Act 91 and the Federal-Aid Highway
Act,92 the new UMT Act regulations provided the Bartels court
with an "appropriate point of reference," in drafting a remedy.as
81. See, e.g., Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Col. 1978)
("enormous difficulties ... would be encountered by any attempt to establish the required
affirmative program through the judicial process."); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226
(E.D. Wis. 1977) (purchase of inaccessible buses discriminatory); Snowden v. Birmingham-
Jefferson County Transit Auth., 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975), aff'd without opinion,
551 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1977) (purchase of inaccessible buses not discriminatory).
82. 405 F. Supp. 1012, 1014-15 (E.D. Wis. 1975).
83. Id. at 1015.
84. The action was before the court as a motion for a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1017.
85. Id. at 1018.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1018-19.
88. Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 233 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
89. 49 C.F.R. § 613.204 (1977). See also 427 F. Supp. at 232.
90. See "Urban Transportation Programming for Elderly and Handicapped Persons," 41
Fed. Reg. 18234 (1976).
91. 49 U.S.C. § 1612(a) (1976).
92. 23 U.S.C. § 142 note (1976).
93. 427 F. Supp. at 233. '
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Under the regulations, recipients of funds allocated by the UMTA
were required to use "special efforts" to ensure that the handi-
capped could effectively use mass transportation facilities.9 4 Hav-
ing determined that the transit authority had discriminated
against the handicapped because the present system was inaccessi-
ble, 5 the court permanently enjoined the transit authority from
acquiring inaccessible vehicles.96 If the transit authority could
demonstrate compelling necessity for immediate purchase of such
vehicles, however, "such that a failure of the system would result
without their purchase . . . [despite the fact] that all diligence is
being used to plan, design and implement facilities and services
which can be effectively utilized by mobility handicapped individu-
als," compliance would be excused.9
While the Bartels court construed the language of section 504
and the UMT Act to be "mandatory in nature,"' Snowden v. Bir-
mingham-Jefferson County Transit Authority" held otherwise.
The defendant in Snowden, federal fund recipients, had procured
buses which could not accommodate wheelchairs.100 The court con-
strued both section 504 and the UMT Act to be mere statements
of federal policy, stating that the statutory language "require[d]
only that 'special efforts' be made" in the planning of mass
transit.'0 ' In the view of the Snowden court, the transit authority
met this standard by installing certain features which made the
buses accessible to some of the ambulatory handicapped.0 2 The
court further concluded that no active exclusion of those confined
to wheelchairs existed: "Although it is necessary for [these] per-
sons . . . to arrange for someone to help them board and alight
from the bus, [they] are allowed to use the transportation vehicles
in questi6n. Thus, it cannot be said that persons who ambulate by
94. 41 Fed. Reg. 18234 (1976).
95. 427 F. Supp. at 231.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 233.
98. 405 F. Supp. at 1018.
99. 407 F. Supp. 394 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
100. The buses at issue had features which made them accessible to certain handicapped
persons, but not to those confined to wheelchairs. These features included stanchions, grab-
rails, step-well lighting, and power-assisted doors. Id. at 396.
101. Id. at 397 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
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wheelchair are excluded from using the defendant's transportation
system." 08
A view similar to Snowden was expressed in United Handi-
capped Federation v. Andre,1 " a decision subsequently vacated by
the Eighth Circuit. In Andre a transit authority had contracted to
buy 338 standard size buses not specially equipped for wheelchairs
in addition to ten small buses which were accessible to wheel-
chairs.10 5 The district court found that the special efforts require-
ment had been satisfied because nothing in either the UMT Act or
section 504 required every standard-sized bus to be accessible.106
Andre, relying on Snowden, concluded that no exclusion of the
handicapped existed as long as the wheelchair-confined "can
arrange for someone to assist them in boarding and exiting the
bus."'01 7 Because the UMT Act regulations had been issued in part
under section 504, however, the Eighth Circuit set aside the judg-
ment, concluding that "§ 504 does create an affirmative duty on
the part of these defendants."108
Although conflicting decisions such as Snowden, Andre and Bar-
tels indicate the difficulty courts have had in interpreting scant ad-
ministrative guidelines, the issuance of DOT's final regulations' 0 '
has made it clear that federal statutes requiring effective access to
the mobility handicapped were intended to be enforced and thus
are no mere expressions of policy."10 A recent Supreme Court deci-
103. Id. Such reasoning seems to directly contravene the policy behind the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973, that is, to afford the handicapped and their families with the opportunity
for greater independence. As the act's legislative history indicates:
Providing service to such [handicapped] individuals may have the eventual out-
come of freeing other members of the handicapped individual's family to return to
employment .... Thus . . . the Committee bill . . . has directed the Secretary to
study methods by which such individuals. . . may be enabled to live more indepen-
dently. It is the Committee's intent . . . that action recommendations will be made
which will be designed to ensure that these individuals will be able to function more
normally within their communities.
S. REP. No. 318, supra note 17, at 19, [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2092-93.
104. 409 F. Supp. 1297 (D. Minn. 1976), vacated, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977).
105. Id. at 1300. The 338 buses had the following special provisions: non-skid floors,
special grab-rails, improved lighting, safety rear doors, and improved destination signs.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1301.
108. 558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977).
109. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.1-.129 (Part 27) (1980).
110. See notes 123-41 infra and accompanying text.
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sion, however, has cast doubt on the requirement of affirmative ac-
tion in discrimination cases governed solely by section 504. In
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, an applicant with a
"serious hearing disability" who was denied admission to nursing
school filed suit alleging a violation of section 504. 1 A unanimous
Court wrote that "neither the language, purpose, nor history of
§ 504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative action obligation
on all recipients of federal funds. ' 1 2 While such language would
seem to prove fatal to aiy meaningful enforcement of section 504,
two factors militate against the application of Davis in mass trans-
portation cases. First, the Davis Court failed to note the legislative
history of section 504 which strongly suggests a reading of the pro-
vision with a requirement of affirmative action.1 Second, the stat-
utory authority for the Court's decision in Davis consisted only of
section 504.14 Because federally subsidized mass transportation in-
volves capital grants under other statutes, the UMT Act or the
Federal-Aid Highway Act, courts in mass transportation inaccessi-
bility suits must consider the DOT regulations promulgated in part
under these independent authorities." 5
IV. The General Provisions of the Final HEW and DOT
Rules
Although HEW and DOT have issued final rules, they have by
no means eliminated major enforcement problems which have con-
fronted courts."' Indeed, HEW itself noted the difficulty in
promulgating rules because of the broad language of the statute,"7
the diversity of types of handicaps, and the wide variety of
programs financed by federal funds." 8 DOT avoided uniform na-
111. 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979).
112. Id. at 411.
113. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974). See notes 49-57 supra and accompanying
text.
114. 442 U.S. at 400.
115. American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
116. See notes 82-108 supra and accompanying text.
117. Early in the rulemaking process, HEW noted, "[wihile we recognize that the statute
creates individual rights, the statute is ambiguous as to the specific scope of these rights."
41 Fed. Reg. 20296 (1976).
118. 42 Fed. Reg. 22676 (1977). The settings where the regulations apply include: em-
ployment, id., Subpart B; accessibility of facilities including transportation, id., Subpart C;
preschool, elementary and secondary education, id., Subpart D; post secondary education,
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tional rules as well, deferring instead to the "local planning pro-
cess.""' In addition, Congress has emasculated even the broad
requirements of the final rules through its refusal to authorize fed-
eral funds to make existing fixed rail transit accessible.'2 0 Recently,
legislation has been introduced in Congress to allow localities com-
plete discretion in deciding what accessible service to provide the
handicapped.12 1 Such proposals for "local options" have also re-
ceived the backing of the executive branch.122 Although the fate of
the final DOT rules is uncertain, this section will briefly outline
their requirements,
A. Accessibility Standards: What Constitutes
Compliance?
In its final rule, HEW set different standards of accessibility de-
pending on whether the facilities being challenged were existing or
were to be newly constructed or altered.'28 In the case of existing
facilities, the program "when viewed in its entirety" was required
to be readily accessible to the handicapped, 24 although structural
changes were not required if other equally effective methods of
compliance were available." 5 By contrast, each newly acquired fa-
cility was required to be readily accessible."
id., Subpart E; and health, welfare and social services, id., Subpart F.
119. DOT notes: "It would be inadvisable for DOT to attempt to formulate uniform
national requirements. . . .The local planning process should have the flexibility to work
out solutions that are consistent with local problems and conditions." 44 Fed. Reg. 31442,
31461 (1979). But see note 186 infra and accompanying text.
120. Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-131, 93 Stat. 1023, 1032. Congress amended section 504 in 1978 to require
the submission of proposed implementing regulations to appropriate authorizing committees
of Congress. Pub. L. No. 95-602, tit. I §§ 119, 122(d)(2), 92 Stat. 2982, 2987 (1978), re-
printed in 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. 11 1978). The prohibition against using federal funds to
retrofit existing fixed rail in the 1980 appropriations bill has been the only action Congress
has taken under this amendment. Telephone interview with Glen Wasserman, UMTA Re-
gional Coordinator, in New York City (Mar. 12, 1981).
121. See notes 184-204 infra and accompanying text.
122. N.Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1981, at B4, col. 5.
123. 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.22(a)-.23 (1979).
124. Id. § 84.22. The Justice Department's final rule requires existing facilities viewed in
the entirety to be "readily accessible and usable by handicapped persons." 28 C.F.R.
§§ 42.520-.522 (1980) (emphasis added). This additional requirement of usability is not part
of the DOT final rule. 49 C.F.R. § 27.65(a) (1980).
125. 45 C.F.R. § 84.22 (1979).
126. Id. § 84.23. In Philadelphia Council of Neigh. Orgs. v. Coleman, 437 F. Supp. 1341
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This HEW distinction between new and existing facilities was
followed in the subsequent DOT final rules.1l 7 In Subpart E, which
governs mass transportation requirements,1 2 8 DOT identified four
different modes of public mass transportation: fixed route bus sys-
tems, 129 rapid and commuter rail systems,130 light rail systems, "
and paratransit systems.' " In each of these areas, accessibility in
existing systems is required to be viewed "in the entirety, "3 3 and
(E.D. Pa. 1977), motion denied sub nom. Philadelphia Council of Neigh. Orgs. v. Adams,
451 F. Supp. 114 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd without opinion sub nom. Philadelphia Council of Neigh.
Orgs. v. Coleman, 578 F.2d 1375 (3d Cir. 1978), a suit decided under a comparable UMT Act
provision, 49 C.F.R. § 609.1 (1977), prior to final HEW rules, plaintiffs contended section
504 and the UMT Act were violated. A new commuter rail station was made accessible with
ramps, grab bars, and wide-entry passageways in public restrooms. Id. at 1360. But 196
existing stations in the commuter network were not similarly equipped. The court held that
under 49 C.F.R. § 609.13(c)(2) only new and not existing fixed facilities had to take into
account the needs of the handicapped. Id. The UMT Act rules, unlike the HEW rule, did
not require overall system accessibility for fixed structures.
127. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.65-.67 (1980). The section entitled "existing facilities" requires:
A recipient shall operate each program or activity to which this part applies so that,
when viewed in the entirety, it is accessible to handicapped persons. This paragraph
does not necessarily require a recipient to make each of its existing facilities or every
part of an existing facility accessible to and usable by handicapped persons.
Id. § 27.65(a) (emphasis added). By contrast, the section on "new facilities" reads:
Each facility or part of a facility constructed by, on behalf of, or for the use of a
recipient shall be designed, contructed, and operated in a manner so that the facility
or part of the facility is accessible to and usable by handicapped persons, if the con-
struction was commenced after the effective date of this part ...
Id. § 27.67(a) (emphasis added).
128. Id. §8 27.81-.107 (1980).
129. Id. § 27.85. "'Fixed route bus system' means a system of buses of any size which
operate on a fixed route pattern on a fixed schedule." Id. § 27.5.
130. Id. § 27.87. "'Rapid rail' means a subway-type transit vehicle railway operated on
exclusive private rights-of-way with high-level platform stations." Id. § 27.5.
131. Id. § 27.89. "'Light rail' means a streetcar-type transit vehicle railway operated on
city streets, semi-private rights-of-way, or exclusive private rights-of-way." Id. § 27.5.
132. Id. § 27.91. "'Public paratransit system' means those forms of collective passenger
transportation which provide shared-ride service to the general public or special categories
of users on a regular and predictable basis and which do not necessarily operate on fixed
schedules or over prescribed routes." Id. § 27.5.
133. Id. § 27.65(a) (1980). DOT specified additional different standards for each mode of
transportation. In the case of fixed route bus systems, each system must be accessible to the
handicapped who can use steps; half the peak hour bus service must be accessible within
three years; accessible buses must be used before inaccessible buses during off-peak service.
Moreover, all new buses must be accessible to the wheelchair handicapped. Id. § 27.85. As
for rapid, commuter, and light rail sytems, DOT requires all stations and vehicles to be
accessible to the handicapped who can use steps; and "key stations"-generally stations
with especially high traffic - must be retrofitted to accommodate the wheelchair handi-
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time limits are specified for compliance depending on the mode of
transportation varying from three to thirty years.1 34 Until accessi-
bility is achieved within these deadlines, recipients are required to
use "best efforts" to make transportation accessible. " DOT enun-
ciated certain additional requirements regarding interim planning
after the compliance deadlines and until full accessibility is
achieved: 1) recipients are to provide or assure the provision of in-
terim accessible transportation within three years of the effective
date of the regulations;13 6 2) annual expenditures for such trans-
portation must equal an amount of two percent of the total
financial assistance the recipient is allocated under section 5 of the
UMT Act; 1 7 and 3) recipients must use "best efforts" in coordinat-
ing existing services to provide for maximum accessibility during
this interim period.13 8
B. Enforcement
Enforcement procedures to the DOT rules "are closely modelled
on the enforcement procedures for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964," 189 as was expressly intended by Congress.14 0 The rules
capped. Between key stations and inaccessible stations in rapid and commuter systems, ac-
cessible connector service must be provided. Id. §§ 27.87, 27.89.
134. Id. § 27.65(c). DOT rules generally require compliance within three years. However,
extensions are granted for "extraordinarily expensive" alterations as follows: 30 years for
existing, fixed facilities for rapid and commuter rail, id. § 27.87(a)(4); five years for rapid rail
vehicles, id.; ten years for commuter rail vehicles, id.; and 20 years for light rail vehicles, id.
§ 27.89(a)(3).
135. Id. § 27.97(a) (1980).
136. Id. § 27.97(b)(1).
137. Id. § 27.97(b)(2)(i).
138. Id. § 27.97(b)(3). The regulations permit the recipient to coordinate all special ser-
vices and programs including those provided by other organizations. 44 Fed. Reg. 31442,
31462 (1979).
139. 44 Fed. Reg. 31442, 31466 (1979).
140. As a Senate report indicated:
The language of section 504, in followig [sic] . . . [the anti-discrimination language of
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 and section 901 of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 1683] further envisions the implementa-
tion of a compliance program which is similar to those Acts, including the promulga-
tion of regulations providing for investigation and review of recipients of Federal
financial assistance, attempts to bring non-complying recipients into voluntary com-
pliance through informal efforts such as negotiation, and the imposition of sanctions
against recipients who continue to discriminate against otherwise qualified handi-
capped persons on the basis of handicap.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 40, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 6390.
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outline a complaint procedure and the due process to be afforded
recipients before federal funds are suspended or withheld-the
prescribed penalty. 4" The DOT rules, however, are silent on the
question of whether a private right to bring judicial suit exists
under section 504, the UMT Act or the Federal-Aid Highway Act.
Similarly, comment to the HEW final rule explains: "To confer
such a right is beyond the authority of the executive branch of gov-
ernment.' 42 While Lloyd had addressed this issue earlier, the
court limited its ruling as applicable only until issuance of effective
enforcement regulations. 48 The Lloyd court, however, stated in
dicta: "In any event, the private cause of action we imply . . .
must continue at least in the form of judicial review of administra-
tive action" once regulations are promulgated.'4 4 Indeed, most
courts ruling after the issuance of HEW's final regulations have
taken this view.145 In Baker v. Bell, one of the more recent suits,
mobility-impaired plaintiffs alleged that the New Orleans transit
authority had violated the UMT Act and section 504 by purchas-
ing buses they were unable to board.'14 The Fifth Circuit held that
141. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.121-.129 (1980). The regulations require each recipient to maintain
on file information regarding the extent of its compliance. Id. § 27.121(b). They also provide
for a periodic review by DOT officials. Id. § 27.123(a). If a handicapped person wishes to
complain, he or she must file a written complaint to DOT within 180 days from the date of
the alleged discrimination. Id. § 27.123(b). Such complaints will be investigated by DOT
which will notify the recipient and attempt to resolve the matter "informally." Id."§
27.123(c)-(d). If these informal means fail, DOT may suspend or terminate federal financial
aid after reasonable notice and an administrative hearing. Id. §§ 27.125-27. The Department
may restore a recipient to full eligibility after the conditions of the administrative order are
fulfilled. Id. § 27.129.
142. 42 Fed. Reg. 22687 (1977).
143. Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d at 1286 n.29.
144. Id.
145. See, e.g., Kling v. County of Los Angeles, 633 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir. 1980) ("all the
other circuits that have considered this issue have held that there is such a right of action");
Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 131 (5th Cir. 1980); Rogers v. Frito-Lay,
Inc., 611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247, 1259
(3rd Cir. 1979); Guertin v. Hackerman, 496 F. Supp. 593, 594 (S.D. Tex. 1980); New Mexico
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. New Mexico, 495 F. Supp. 391, 396 (D.N.M. 1980). But see
Trageser v. Libbie Rehabilitation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 89 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 947 (1979) ("A private action under § 504 to redress employment discrimination
. . . may not be maintained unless a primary objective of the federal financial assistance is
to provide employment." (emphasis added)); Doe v. New York Univ., 442 F. Supp. 522, 523-
24 (S.D.N.Y.- 1978) (though HEW regulations exist, HEW must be given opportunity to
demonstrate adequacy of enforcement mechanism before judicial review applies).
146. 630 F.2d 1046, 1048-49 (5th Cir. 1980).
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the right to a private suit was consistent with the legislative intent
of section 504.147 The Supreme Court will decide this question this
term in University of Texas v. Camenisch, 14  where a deaf gradu-
ate student has sued to have the university provide him with a sign
language interpreter. In Camenisch, the Fifth Circuit held that the
student had a right to bring a private suit, citing Lloyd's analysis
of the test enunciated in Cort v. Ash.149 The Fifth Circuit in
Camenisch noted that the Supreme Court has already "seemingly
acknowledged" the propriety of judicial consideration of section
504 suits in Campbell v. Kruse."' Thus, because the circuit courts
have upheld the private suit under section 504, it should continue
as a right under the Lloyd interpretation of Cort even though DOT
and HEW have issued final regulations providing only for adminis-
trative action.1 1
C. When May Compliance Be Waived?
DOT regulations provide for a waiver of compliance with its
standards for existing rapid, commuter, and light rail systems, but
not for new systems or for existing fixed bus routes.15 2 The recipi-
ent must, however, first meet several strict requirements before it
is granted a waiver of any of its obligations because the rules re-
quire alternative service "substantially as good as or better than
147. Id. at 1055 n.21.
148. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), argued, 49 U.S.L.W.
3740 (Mar. 31, 1981).
149. Id. at 130-31 (5th Cir. 1980). See text accompanying notes 58-66 supra.
150. Id. at 131 (citing Campbell v. Kruse, 434 U.S. 808 (1977)). In Campbell, handi-
capped students alleged a Virginia statute providing for tuition grants denied them equal
protection under the fourteenth amendment and violated section 504. Kruse v. Campbell,
431 F. Supp. 180, 185 (E.D. Va. 1977), vacated, 434 U.S. at 808 (1977). The district court
held the statute unconstitutional. 431 F. Supp. at 188. The Supreme Court remanded the
case to the district court for consideration of the claim based on section 504. 434 U.S. at 808.
151. The Justice Department's final rule is in agreement. See 28 C.F.R. § 42.530 (1980).
The Camenisch court noted also that the legislative history of section 504 revealed a private
cause of action was contemplated by Congress: " 'This approach to implementation of Sec-
tion 504, which closely follows [title VI] . . . would ensure administrative due process (right
to hearing, right to review), provide for administrative consistency within the Federal gov-
ernment as well as a relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial remedy through
a private action.'" 616 F.2d at 131 n.6 (emphasis and words in brackets added by
Camenisch court), quoting S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 39-40, [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6373, 6391.
152. 49 C.F.R. § 27.99 (1980). There is no waiver provision for fixed bus routes, para-
transit systems, or new facilities.
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that which would have been provided absent a waiver." 53 These
alternative services must be developed in consultation with handi-
capped groups; and public hearings at the local level must be held
and documented. 5 4 Finally, when a waiver is given, a complete
transition plan for an accessible system must be submitted to
DOT. 55 In addition, recipients in the cities with the largest ex-
isting inaccessible rapid rail systems,' New York City, Chicago,
Philadelphia, Boston and Cleveland, are required to spend an
amount equal to at least five percent of the area's total capital
grants received under section 5 of the UMT Act.157
While comments to the final DOT rule caution that only "meri-
torious" requests for waivers will be granted,5 the comments do
not describe situations or enunciate factors which might warrant
waiver grants. Most likely, the circumstances under which a recipi-
ent might formally seek a waiver would resemble those which con-
fronted the courts before the issuance of final DOT regulations.
Defendants to suits where the handicapped claimed inaccessible
existing mass transit systems have asserted two defenses inter alia:
expense of compliance and lack of technology necessary to comply.
In Andre'" and Snowden'60 where plaintiffs sought accessible
buses, defendants asserted the defense of lack of technology. Hold-
ing for the defendant transit authority, the Snowden court noted
that the uncontroverted affidavits of the UMTA showed that at
the time of the suit, no device existed which had proved reliable
for use in a standard urban transit bus and which would result in
total accessibility.'' It therefore upheld the lack of technology de-
fense, concluding, "'[t]he Constitution as a continuously operative
charter of government does not demand the impossible or the
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,464 (1979).
157. 49 C.F.R. § 27.99 (1980).
158. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,464 (1979).
159. 409 F. Supp. at 1300. The court observed that "no bus manufacturer in the United
States presently produces a standard-size transit bus that is specially designed for total
accessibility by the wheelchair handicapped with features providing safety for the handi-
capped and all other passengers."
160. 407 F. Supp. at 394.
161. Id. at 398.
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impracticable.' "162
More recently, however, courts have rejected the argument of
non-existent technology. In Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of
America v. Coleman," where a group of handicapped individuals
sued under section 504, the UMT Act, and the Federal-Aid High-
way Act to enjoin the purchase of inaccessible buses,1 4 the court
suggested the rationale behind earlier cases no longer applied be-
cause an on-going DOT project to develop accessible transporta-
tion - "Transbus" - seemed workable. 1" Similarly, in American
Public Transit Association v. Goldschmidt1" when an association
of transit authorities sought to invalidate the final DOT regula-
tions, it alleged DOT failed to recognize technological limitations
as to wheelchair lifts for buses and "gapclosing" devices between
subway cars and platforms. 67 The district court rejected this argu-
ment because the record indicated feasible lifts were currently
162. Id. (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1943)). The court in Bartels
v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, articulated the problem well: The Court is confronted with
countervailing problems. The plaintiffs are entitled to the benefits of the mass transit sys-
tem, now. The statute does not allow the County [defendants] to wait until the perfect
solution is found. At the same time the technology necessary to implement some of the
proposed solutions to the problem is not fully advanced. . . . Id.
163. 451 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
164. Id. at 8-9.
165. Id. at 11. The court relied on a statement by DOT Secretary Brock Adams that
Transbus, a project to design accessible buses, was viable: "'A review of the record con-
vinces me that, at a minimum the three major domestic bus manufacturers could begin
Transbus deliveries within 31/ years. This date allows almost 21/2 years for development
before bidding would begin, and approximately 15 months thereafter before the buses are
actually delivered.'" Id. at 11 (quoting statement of Secretary Adams, Press Conference on
Transbus, May 19, 1977, at 2). "Thus, the technology which did not exist when Andre...
and Snowden. . . were decided in the district courts now exists." Id. DOT mandated that
accessible buses built according to certain technical specifications be purchased after Sep-
tember 30, 1979. 42 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (1977) (currently codified at 49 C.F.R. § 609.15 (1980)).
Transbus, however, may no longer be a project under active consideration. In 1979, DOT
commissioned an independent group to study the Transbus project. CoMMiSSIoN ON SocI-
OTECHNICAL SYSTMs, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNcIL, NRC TRANSBUS STUDY viii (Washington,
D.C. 1979). The NRC study reported that when a consortium of three cities, Los Angeles,
Miami, and Philadelphia, requested 530 Transbuses, no American bus company responded
with bids. The report concluded that the decision of bus manufacturers not to bid was rea-
sonable in view of "considerable financial risk." Id. at 2. The report further concluded that
delays in producing the bus were likely. Id. at 3. The final DOT rule exists independently of
the earlier Transbus mandate which is still in force, although no Transbuses have been
built. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,457 (1979).
166. 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
167. Id. at 829.
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available and because the rules did not require "gapclosing" de-
vices unless found to be necessary for accessibility. 6 ' Moreover,
the court stated: "[ilt is well settled that an agency may impose
requirements entailing more advanced technology than exists at
the time the requirement is adopted.""' Because DOT regulations
are still pending congressional review, American Public Transit
Association may continue as good authority only if the rules are
upheld by Congress. 17 0
The second defense often asserted by transit systems in section
504 suits by the handicapped concerns the untoward expense of
compliance. Certainly, the early legislative history of the statute
indicates an awareness of the potentially great costs involved.17 1
Moreover, a study which accompanied HEW's notice of intent to
issue proposed rulemaking concluded that "the benefits forthcom-
ing (psychic as well as pecuniary) provide a substantial offset to
the costs that will be incurred. 17 2 A number of courts have also
held that compliance with section 504 was required despite great
expense.17 As the Eighth Circuit held when it vacated the district
court's ruling in Andre, precedent supported the requirement of
affirmative conduct on the part of certain entities under section
504, even when such modification became expensive.174 And as
noted in Hairston v. Drosick:
To deny to a handicapped child access to a regular public school classroom
in receipt of federal financial assistance without compelling educational jus-
tification constitutes discrimination and a denial of the benefits of such pro-
168. Id.
169. Id. at 830.
170. See notes 184-97 infra and accompanying text.
171. As Representative Charles Vanik, in his attempt to amend the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to include a prohibition of discrimination against the handicapped, commented,
"[w]hile implementation of full due process will be burdensome ... it will serve the best
interests [of the handicapped], which they are entitled to as U.S. citizens." 117 CONG. REc.
H45975 (1971).
172. O'Neill, Discrimination Against Handicapped Persons - The Costs, Benefits and
Inflationary Impact of Implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Cover-
ing Recipients of HEW Financial Assistance, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg. 20,312, 20,320
(1976).
173. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d 413, 415-16 (8th Cir. 1977);
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277, 1281-84 (7th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Converse
College, 436 F. Supp. 635, 637 (D.S.C. 1977); Hairston v. Drosick, 423 F. Supp. 180, 184
(S.D. W.Va. 1976).
174. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 558 F.2d at 415.
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gram in violation of the statute [section 504]. School officials must make
every effort to include such children within the regular public classroom sit-
uation, even at great expense to the school system.'6
Although the Supreme Court in Davis178 noted in dicta that under
section 504 federal fund recipients were not required to bear "un-
due financial and administrative burdens, ' 17 7 the district court in
American Public Transportation Association held that even if sec-
tion 504 does not require such affirmative action, the authority for
DOT final regulations is vested in two other statutes, the UMT Act
and the Federal-Aid Highway Act, which require "special ef-
forts.' 7  These regulations, moreover, clearly require compliance
even if "extraordinarily expensive," though consideration is given
in the form of a time extension of up to thirty years. 79
As the court observed in American Public Transportation Asso-
ciation, the early legislative history of section 504 suggested Con-
gress did not believe the measure would necessarily be expen-
sive. 80 Recent reports indicate, however, that Congress has
reversed its position.'' A House report accompanying the 1980 De-
partment of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation
Bill'82 expressed concern that the DOT regulations "might require
the expenditure of vast sums with only minimal benefits to handi-
capped persons." s Under this rationale, efforts were made during
175. 423 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. W.Va. 1976) (emphasis added).
176. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
177. Id. at 412.
178. 485 F. Supp. 811, 824, 826 (D.D.C. 1980).
179. 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.81-.93 (1980).
180. 485 F. Supp. at 826.
181. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1980, at B1O, col. 1. A November, 1979 Congressional Budget
Office study concluded:
the program [implementing the DOT regulations) would be very expensive - $6.8
billion over the next 30 years - [and] relatively few handicapped persons would ben-
efit from it. The Congress is currently considering whether to fund these changes
through reductions in other transit programs or through new appropriations - or
whether to enact new legislation requiring DOT or HEW to modify their rules.
Congressional Budget Office, Urban Transportation for Handicapped Persons: Alternative
Federal Approaches, SUMMARY, reprinted in 126 CONG. REc. S8151 (daily ed. June 25, 1980)
[hereinafter cited as CBO Study].
182. Pub. L. No. 96-131, 93 Stat. 1023, 1027 (1979). The act provided that money given
should not be used to retrofit existing fixed rail transit systems under the section 504
regulations.
183. H.R. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1979) (Committee on Appropriations).
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the final hours of the 96th Congress to pass legislation calling for
"local options" in deciding what transportation services should be
afforded the handicapped'" as an alternative to compliance with
section 504 regulations. Proponents of local options charged that
the DOT rules were costly 86 and inflexible."' As a result, two sucb
major plans were considered during the 96th Congress, one by
Congressman James J. Howard as part of a large appropriations
bill187 and the other by Congressman James C. Cleveland as an
amendment to the Howard bill.18
The more stringent of the two proposals, the Howard "local op-
tion" plan allowed any recipient of federal funds to develop an "ef-
fective" transportation system in consultation with the local handi-
capped community. Such a program would be subject to approval
by the Secretary of Transportation,"9 who would determine
whether the program met specified tests of efficacy. First, the pro-
gram would have to provide the handicapped with transportation
covering the same service areas, having the same hours, and at the
same fare as that provided the general public. The Howard option
would provide for trips in the amount of time and within a transfer
frequency "reasonably comparable [to the general public's trans-
184. Surface Transportation Act of 1980, H.R. 6417, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG.
Rzc. H11600-01 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Howard Proposal]; Cleveland
Amendment to H.R. 6417, Id. at H11616-17 [hereinafter cited as Cleveland Amendment];
Zorinsky Amendment to Federal Public Transportation Act, S. 2720, 126 CONG. REc. S8150-
57 (daily ed. June 25, 1980). The Congressional Budget Office study outlined two alterna-
tives to the DOT regulations. CBO Study, supra note 181, at 88152. The "Taxi Plan" em-
phasized door-to-door separate service. Id. The "Auto Plan" proposed to help severely
handicapped persons "purchase and specially equip their own cars." Id.
185. As one Congressman noted, "[t]he problem I find with the current rules of the De-
partment of Transportation is that they are so inflexible. Does anyone think that every city
in this country, no matter what it's [sic] size, has the same situation and conditions to con-
tend with in dealing with the handicapped?" 126 CONG. REc. S8151 (daily ed. June 25, 1980)
(remarks of Rep. Zorinsky).
186. "[T]he inflexibility of the Department of Transportation in applying 504 is the rea-
son we are in the mess we are in right now. The present law [the Rehabilitation Act itself] is
fundamentally not bad law." 126 CONG. Rac. H11927 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Simon).
187. Howard Proposal, supra note 184, at H11600-01. Indeed, certain proponents of the
"local option" had formerly advocated full accessibility for the handicapped. As Congress-
man James J. Howard (Dem., N.J.) observed: "I am the first to admit that full accessibiiity
has not proved workable." N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1980, at B10, col. 1.
188. 126 CONG. Rzc. H11616 (daly ed. Dec. 2, 1980).
189. Howard Proposal, supra note 184, at H11600.
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portation] to the extent operationally practicable."19 0 Second, ser-
vice would be provided regardless of trip purpose. e1 Third, the re-
quested transportation would be provided within twenty-four
hours after receipt of request during the first two years of the pro-
gram, within eight hours during the second two years, and within
six hours thereafter. Fourth, "where feasible," service would be
provided to at least one person accompanying the handicapped. 9a
Under the Howard legislation, DOT sanctions would also be
greatly relaxed; if a recipient failed to comply with the program it
has devised, it would lose not less than twenty-five percent of its
federal funds under the Surface Transportation Act until it
"agrees to take the necessary steps to achieve compliance."'193
The second proposed local option, the Cleveland Amendment,
further diluted the DOT standards of compliance already relaxed
by the Howard proposal.19 4 Much of the language of the two mea-
sures was similar, but for two important differences. First, the
Cleveland Amendment dropped the requirement for "effective"
service. 95 Second, it established a lesser test for determining com-
-pliance. In the Howard legislation, the program would have to "en-
sure that no handicapped person . . . is denied effective transpor-
tation."'96 By contrast, the Cleveland Amendment proposed that
190. Id.
191. Handicapped groups regard this stipulation to be important:
Many [present paratransit systems] ... have trip priority designations, meaning that
some individual decides whether one particular trip is as important as another. Usu-
ally medical trips have high priority and a request for such a trip may very well force
the cancellation of one previously scheduled if the non-medical trip, in the opinion of
the service provider, is "not as important."
CANNON, FULL MOBILITY - COUNTING THE COSTS Op THE ALTERNATivES 23 (1980) (published
by American Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities) [hereinafter cited as FULL MOBILITY].
192. Howard Proposal, supra note 184, at H11600-01.
193. Id. at H11601. Cf. 49 C.F.R. § 27.129(e) (1980), the DOT regulations, which provide
as a penalty "suspension or termination, or refusal to grant or continue Federal financial
assistance" until the recipient complies.
194. While many handicapped groups feared the Howard legislation would "undo" sec-
tion 504, they regarded the "Cleveland Amendment" with even more apprehension. Inter-
view with James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Association, in New York
City (Nov. 11, 1980). One Congressman opposing the Cleveland Amendment described it as
having "loophole[s] you could drive a bus with a [wheelchair] lift through." 126 CONG. REc.
H11929 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Miller).
195. 126 CONG. REc. H11616 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1980). See also 126 CONG. REC. H11926
(daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Simon).
196. 126 CONG. REC. H11600 (daily ed. Dec. 2, 1980).
[Vol. IX
1981] EQUAL ACCESS 923
the Secretary approve any "program respecting handicapped per-
sons who cannot reasonably use" generally available services. 197
Despite wide Congressional endorsement of local options, neither
the Howard plan nor the Cleveland amendment is now law.198
Handicapped groups have opposed such options vigorously for sev-
eral reasons. First, they fear that enforcement, already lax under
present DOT regulations, will become meaningless should localities
be allowed to set their own standards of accessibility. 1 9 Second,
although local option proponents stress "flexibility" in planning,0 0
this benefit would inure only to the transit operator and not to the
handicapped constituency. 01 Third, "local options" may be much
more costly than current estimates indicate.02 Fourth, the opera-
197. Id. at H11616.
198. The Cleveland Amendment narrowly lost by two votes. 126 CONG. REC. H11629
(daily ed. Dec. 2. 1980). The Howard proposal, part of his larger $22 billion appropriations
package for mass transit aid, was approved by the House. The measure was defeated in the
Senate, however, because many members of the lame duck session felt the new Congress
should have the opportunity to study the issue. N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1980, at A45, col.1. It is
evident, though, that efforts to change the DOT section 504 regulations will not have died
with the adjournment of the 96th Congress. President Reagan's administration has
"strongly urged" that localities and not the federal government should decide how to pro-
vide public transportation for the handicapped. N.Y. Times, Jan. 7, 1981, at B5, col. 1. Un-
less some local option is adopted, the Reagan administration believes the implementation of
DOT regulations could increase fares by as much as $38 per ride. Id. See CBO Study, supra
note 181, at S8152. On the local New York City level, too, legislation such as the Howard
and Cleveland proposals has engendered strong governmental support. N.Y. Times, Dec. 5,
1980, at B10, col. 1.
199. As an opponent to the Cleveland Amendment argued:
[I]n 1970 this body urged local officials across this Nation [through passage of the
Urban Mass Transportation Act] to provide transportation for the handicapped; and
what was the result of that urging by this body? The result was absolutely nothing.
Those local officials did not provide help; and so when we are urged to turn this over
to local officials and have faith in them, I suggest the record in the particular area has
not been a good one.
126 CONG. REC. H11926 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Simon).
200. See note 186 supra and accompanying text.
201. Local option opponents base this conclusion on current paratransit systems oper-
ated pursuant to 1976 UMTA "special efforts" requirements. FULL MOBILITY, supra note
191, at xiii. Current systems are operated under considerable budgetary restraints and,
therefore, require advance registration and notice. They also have restrictions on usage, ser-
vice area, hours of operation, trip purpose and fare. Id.
202. The handicapped base their conclusion that the cost of local options has been un-
derestimated on the study conducted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) which ana-
lyzed options to implementing the DOT regulations. Id. at ix. See CBO Study, supra note
181. The CBO concluded that a total of 1,654 accessible paratransit vehicles were necessary
to serve the entire United States at a cost of $120 million per year. As the handicapped
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tional difficulties such as schedule disruptions which transit au-
thorities claim will result from making an entire system accessible
may be overstated or even illusionary.203 Finally, local options will
result in discriminatory transit plans, contrary to section 504.204
V. New York City's Predicament
Whether a locality should be allowed to develop its own trans-
portation policy and possibly violate the statutory rights of the
handicapped, the issue facing the Congress, is also the problem
facing New York City. As one of the five largest cities in the
United States with an inaccessible existing mass transit system,0 5
New York City has a system which encompasses several modes of
transportation: rapid rail, fixed route buses, and commuter rail.20 "
noted, this amounted to an average of 33 vehicles per state - hardly enough to provide
adequate service; the CBO study, moreover, assumed each handicapped passenger would
only take five one-way trips per month. Id. at 13.
203. FULL MOBILITY, supra note 191, at 7-8. Indeed, the Santa Clara County Transit
District which operates bus lifts with moving handrails "has observed a decrease in dwell
time by allowing some semi-ambulatory elderly people to use the lift instead of waiting for
them to climb laboriously up the steps." Id. at 8. Moreover, the type of lift employed may
make a difference in whether a transit system experiences operational difficulties. For exam-
ple, in New York, the MTA plans to purchase a lift which operates from the rear door, thus
requiring the driver to leave his seat. Interview with Robert A. Olmsted, Assistant Director
of Planning, MTA, in New York City (Mar. 4, 1981). By contrast, in Seattle, Washington,
the transit system has acquired buses with lifts which operate from the front door and
which can be operated mechanically by the driver from his seat. Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
Dec. 28, 1980, § H at 6, col. 1. These special buses now serve 1,500 to 2,000 disabled persons
a month. Id.
204. FULL MOBILITY, supra note 191, at 21-23. The handicapped note that current re-
strictions placed on separate services such as pre-registration with government or social
agencies and certification by physicians mean that mass transit service is not made available
to visitors who do not live permanently in the service area. Id. at 22. Also, though systems
may purport to have no restrictions as to trip purpose, they may nevertheless impose them
by virtue of the fact that they are oversubscribed. Id. at 23. These, among others, are exam-
ples of denying equal transit service to individuals solely on the basis of their handicap in
direct contravention of section 504. Id. See also text accompanying note 79 supra.
205. 44 Fed. Reg. 31,464 (1979).
206. Rapid rail facilities include the 230 route mile system known as the New York City
subways and the 14 route mile system operated by the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operat-
ing Authority. Fixed route bus sytems include 2,500 vehicles owned by the City of New York
and operated by the New York City Transit Authority; the 2,060 vehicles owned by New
York City and operated by the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority;
and the 327 vehicles largely owned by Nassau County and operated by the Metropolitan
Suburban Bus Authority, an MTA subsidiary. Commuter rail includes the Long Island Rail
Road (LIRR), Conrail's Hudson, Harlem and New Haven lines, and the New York portion
of Conrail's Hoboken lines. The LIRR is a wholly-owned subsidiary of MTA, while the three
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MTA has prepared two reports to examine the feasibility of pro-
viding accessible transportation. The first,07 prepared in response
to section 321 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1978,208 analyzed only the rapid and commuter rail systems.20 ' The
second 10 was submitted by MTA in fulfillment of the DOT section
504 regulations which required development of a "transition plan"
defining a program to achieve accessibility.2 ' In this second study,
MTA relied on the section 321 report but also covered the remain-
ing modes of transportation under its jurisdiction.2  On the basis
of these reports, MTA approved making its buses accessible but
expressly disapproved retrofitting its rail systems,21 concluding:
The additional capital and operating costs are enormous, especially in light
of the projections of few additional handicapped riders. . . .[Tihe accessi-
bility requirements raise the expectations of handicapped persons beyond
what is reasonably achievable - both physically and fiscally - and to that
extent represent a cruel hoax on the handicapped community.
214
Conrail lines are under contract to MTA. New York Mass Transportation Authority, Tran-
sition Plan, supra note 3, at 7-8.
207. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, New York City Transportation Authority,
and Staten Island Transit Operating Authority, Operator's Comments on Section 321 Rail
Retrofit Evaluation Studies (Mar. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Operator's Comments]. This
document accompanied a study conducted by consultants to the UMTA. New York City
Transit Authority, Section 321(a) Rail Retrofit Evaluation vii (January 1980) [hereinafter
cited as Section 321 Report]. The Section 321 Report states. "This is a technical report and
•.. should not be construed to represent policies of the Board of the New York Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority. Id. The Operator's Comment, however, expressly represents MTA's
views. Operator's Comments, supra at 2.
208. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-599, § 321, 92 Stat.
6637 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1612 note (Supp. II 1978)).
209. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 2.
210. Transition Plan, supra note 3.
211. 49 C.F.R. § 27.103 (1980). Certain members of the New York City handicapped
community argue that the MTA did not fully meet the DOT rules governing the transistion
plan which require that federal fund recipients hold "public hearings" regarding proposed
plans. See 49 C.F.R. § 27.107(c) (1980). They argue, instead, that the so-called "public fo-
rums" held by the MTA included only presentations by the transit operators with no partic-
ipation by the MTA board. Moreover, the operators did not furnish the public with copies
of the transition plan. Interview with James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veter-
ans' Ass'n in New York City (Mar. 10, 1981).
212. See note 206 supra.
213. Letter from Richard Ravitch, Chairman of MTA, to Neil Goldschmidt, Secretary of
Transportation (Dec. 31, 1980), reprinted in Transition Plan, supra note 3.
214. Letter from John D. Simpson, Executive Director of MTA to Theodore C. Lutz,
Administrator, Urban Mass Transporation Administration (Mar. 3, 1980), reprinted in
Operator's Comments, supra note 207.
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By contrast, the Citizens' Advisory Council, a coalition of handi-
capped groups, drafted an alternative transition plan "within the
framework""1" of the DOT regulations - in essence, advocating a
local option. A comparison between the MTA Transition Plan and
the Alternative Plan is difficult because the scope of each is differ-
ent. As required by the DOT regulations,216 MTA studied the en-
tire mass transit system it operates, whereas the handicapped
group, convened by the MTA, was instructed to consider 21 7 only
rapid rail in conjunction with fixed route bus systems and para-
transit vehicles, 1 8 thereby omitting commuter rail. Yet, a compari-
son between the two plans may be useful in evaluating the efficacy
of the DOT regulations, the scope of MTA's vision - and, indeed,
the viability of section 504 itself.
A. MTA's Findings
DOT regulations specify three main subjects of compliance for
existing rapid and commuter rail systems: stations, vehicles, and
connector service between accessible and inaccessible stations.2 1'
Although DOT rules generally regard existing facilities as accessi-
ble when viewed in their "entirety, '220 they further specify differ-
ent, more detailed standards for each of these three areas. In the
case of a system's stations, all must be made accessible to the
handicapped who can use steps;21 and "key stations" must be
made accessible to wheelchair users.22 Applying DOT's narrow
215. Joint New York City Section 504 Transportation Citizens' Advisory Committee, Al-
ternative Transition Plan for Compliance with USDOT Section 504 Regulations 1 (Oct.
1980) [hereinafter cited as Alternative Plan].
216. 49 C.F.R. § 27.103(c)(2) (1980).
217. Interview with James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n, in
New York City (Mar. 10, 1981). See also Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 1.
218. Alternative Plan; supra note 215, at 2.
219. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87 (1980).
220. Id. § 27.87(a).
221. Id. § 27.87(a)(1).
222. Id. DOT defines "key stations" narrowly. In the case of rapid rail, key stations
include:
(A) Stations where passenger boardings exceed average station boardings by at least
15 percent; (B) Transfer points on a rail line or between rail lines; (C) Major in-
terchange points with other transportation modes; (D) End stations, unless an end
station is close to another accessible station; (E) Stations serving major activity cen-
ters of the following types: employment and government centers, institutions of
higher learning, and hospitals or other health care facilities; or (F) Stations that are
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definitions for key stations, the MTA determined that 255 of 487
of its rapid rail stations had to be made fully accessible 23 and rec-
ommended the installation of 762 elevators,22' a figure which in-
cluded back-up elevators to be used if a so-called "basic elevator"
broke down.2 2s MTA further found eighty-two commuter rail sta-
tions to be "key"'' 6 and suggested that alterations such as ramps,
elevators, and accessible restrooms and ticket windows be made to
these stations.27 At stations where the height of the car entrance is
not level with the platform, MTA specified replacement of low
level platforms with full length high level platforms."8
In addition, DOT requires that vehicles or subway cars be made
accessible to the handicapped who can use steps, but that only one
vehicle per train need be accessible to wheelchair users.2 9 The
MTA's Operator's Comment, however, went beyond the DOT re-
quirement by advocating that all of its 6,600 subway cars be made
accessible.3 In addition, it recommended the installation of a de-
special trip generators for sizeable numbers of handicapped persons.
For commuter rail systems, key stations are those that are: (A) Transfer points on a
rail line or between rail lines; (B) Major interchange points with other transportation
modes; (C) End stations, unless an end station is close to another accessible station;
(D) Stations serving major activity centers of the following types: employment and
government centers, institutions of higher learning, and hospitals or other health care
facilties; (E) Stations that are special trip generators for sizeable numbers of handi-
capped persons; or (F) stations that are distant from other accessible stations.
Id. § 27.87(a)(1)(i)-(ii).
223. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 88, 17.
224. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 28. Other improvements to key stations
included ramps, the designation and marking of a wheelchair accessible pathway from street
to platform with the removal of all barriers along that pathway, and installation of supple-
mentary closed circuit television where needed for improved security. Transition Plan,
supra note 3, at 88.
225. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 29-30.
226. MTA identified as "key stations" 47 on the LIRR line, Transition Plan, supra note
3, at 112; 28 on the Conrail Hudson, Harlem and New Haven Lines, id. at 119, and seven on
the Conrail Hoboken line, id. at 125.
227. Id. at 105.
228. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 106-07. The earlier Section 321 Study had advo-
cated construction of "high-level short length mini-platforms." But these were rejected in
favor of full length platforms in view of the possible hazards of "double-stopping" should an
accessible car not be properly aligned at a mini-platform. Id. at 106.
229. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(2) (1980).
230. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 12. MTA reasoned:
Because trains operate in either direction, and because trains are disassembled and
reassembled frequently to remove cars for inspection and/or repair, to change train
lengths, etc., all cars must be made accessible in order to assure that there will be
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vice known as a "tie down" as part of this retrofitting effort, 13 al-
though such devices were only required in new vehicles.'s
accessible car [sic) at a known predetermined position in the train.
Id. at 23 (emphasis in original). In its Transition Plan the MTA subsequently revised its
position and called for retrofitting three-fourths of the cars under the same rationale. It did
not, however, account for the reduction of its estimate. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 84-
86. Retrofitting involves the installation of non-slip floor material, audible and visible door
alarms, priority seating signs, and wheelchair tiedowns. Id. at 85.
231. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 19-20. See also Transition Plan, supra
note 3, at 85.
232. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(b) (1980). The MTA consultant in its Section 321 Report recom-
mended the installation of a second device optional in existing cars - "gapfillers," devices
used to close the gap between vehicles and station platforms. Section 321 Report, supra
note 207, C app. at C-1. The MTA, however, has expressly rejected the use of car-borne
gapfillers as "undeveloped, unproven, and subject to many potential operational and safety
hazards .... " The MTA noted, also, the "very high" estimated capital and operational
costs. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 87. As noted by DOT, "gap closing devices, if deter-
mined to be necessary for accessib[ility] ...are not required for vehicles for which solicita-
tions are issued before January 1, 1983." 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(b) (1980). This provision was
challenged on the ground of technological impossibility. See American Public Transit Ass'n
v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. at 828-30. See also notes 166-70 supra and accompanying text.
The MTA has also objected to the devices in view of the operational difficulties:
It is assumed that the gapfiller will not be used except on demand when needed by
a handicapped passenger. When a train arrives at an accessible station, a handi-
capped person waiting in the "accessible zone" needing the device, would be observed
by the conductor who would be prepared to activate the gapfiller on the designated
accessible car after the train's doors have been opened. As exiting passengers would
have no way of knowing a handicapped passenger wishes to board, they would first
have to be allowed to exit. Assuming no interference from passengers who wish to
board (who would be directed to, or voluntarily seek to use, adjacent doors), the con-
ductor can then activate the gapfiller. Audiovisual warning devices would warn other
passengers that the device is in motion and not to use the door in question. The
handicapped passenger could then board and, if a wheelchair user, would seek the
wheelchair berthing position. If the car is crowded, as would be the normal rush hour
case, crowd impedence will make it difficult for the wheelchair passenger to place
himself in a secure position in the proper location, further increasing dwell time.
Upon completion of this boarding procedure the gapfiller would be retracted.
When the wheelchair passenger wishes to get off at a particular station, he or she
will have to actuate a signal device to alert the conductor. Upon stopping and open-
ing the train's doors, exiting passengers would first have to be allowed to exit. Assum-
ing entering passengers shift to other doors, the conductor would deploy the gapfiller,
observe the exiting handicapped passenger, retract the device, and if all goes well, the
train can depart.
Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 16-17. The MTA believes this process coupled
with use of tiedowns could reduce the capacity of the subway system in rush hour by 30 to
40 percent. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, at A17, col. 3. The MTA has, instead, proposed to
hire 2,160 attendants to man 460 platforms around the clock to aid wheelchair passengers.
Operator's Comment, supra note 207, at 17-18. Gapfillers which are not car-borne have been
in use at the Fourteenth Street Lexington Avenue IRT Station and the South Ferry Seventh
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DOT rules require accessibility no later than three years after
the effective date of the regulations, July 2, 1979, although the
time limit is extended for extraordinarily expensive structural
changes to thirty years for existing fixed facilities, five years for
rapid rail vehicles, and ten years for commuter rail vehicles.2 33 Fur-
thermore, steady progress is required in each instance.23 MTA es-
timated that over the twenty-nine year period of the transition
plan, capital costs for fixed facilities and vehicles would total some
$1.4 billion. It further estimated the increase in annual operating
and maintenance costs attributable to compliance ranging from
twenty-three million dollars per year in the early years to more
than $100 million after the year 2000.285 In view of one MTA pro-
jection that as few as 413 wheelchair handicapped would use an
accessible system on any given day, s MTA regarded the cost as
Avenue IRT Station for many years without difficulty. Interview with James Weisman,
Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n, in New York City (Nov. 11, 1980).
233. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(4) (1980).
234. Id.
235. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 58. The estimates are in 1980 dollars.
236. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, at 17, col. 4. MTA based this figure on the experience of
San Francisco's Bay Area Rapid Transit System (BART). It must be noted, however, that
while BART itself is accessible, there is low ridership because the system serves a very lim-
ited area and connector services are inaccessible. Interview with James Weisman, Counsel,
Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n, in New York City (Nov. 11, 1980). The Transition Plan
itself contains no statement on projected ridership; the MTA's Operator's Comments, how-
ever, estimates there are approximately 380,000 persons with "limited transit mobility." Of
this number, approximately 117,000, including 22,800 wheelchair bound, are presently ex-
cluded from public transportation. A consultant to the MTA estimated that some 1,824 are
"potential transit riders" who would use an accessible rapid transit system. Under this pro-
jection, the MTA estimated the operation cost at $51 to $171 per wheelchair subway ride.
As of March 1980, the cost per ride was approximately 75c. Operator's Comments, supra
note 207, at 10-11.
Studies of ridership such as those conducted by the MTA may be flawed. Interview with
James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n, in New York City (Nov. 11,
1980). As an independent 1979 report by the National Research Council indicated, all the
major studies attempting to identify the transportation handicapped have "serious method-
ological problems." COMMISSION ON SOCIOTECHNICAL SYSTEMS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
NRC TRANSBUS STUDY 40 (1979). The NRC study criticized the ridership studies because
they required those polled to identify their problems in using transit, thus "encourag[ing]
them to report minor problems as barriers to transit use." Id. For example, the most influ-
ential of these studies, performed by Grey Advertising, a consultant to the UMTA in 1976-
78, attempted to identify those with functional problems in the use of conventional mass
transportation. Id. at 42. However, the Grey study concluded that non-functional problems
such as the fear of getting lost or mugged, the inability to calculate or pay fares, or the fear
of slipping on floors were also important barriers to use. Id. at 47 citing GREY ADVERTISING,
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excessive.
B. The Citizens' Advisory Committee Alternative Plan
MTA criticized the DOT regulations as "extremely rigid and
provid[ing] little flexibility in developing cost-effective plans to
serve handicapped persons."' 7 Clearly, the Citizens' Advisory
Committee Alternative Plan also implicitly took this position-
albeit in an attempt to salvage the right of New York City's handi-
capped to accessible mass transportation. Although its proposal re-
jected certain DOT requirements,38 the Committee arrived at a
more practical and less costly plan than did MTA through creative
use of existing systems, supplementing them with paratransit and
fixed route bus systems and, only when necessary, with structural
alterations.
The most significant departure of the alternative plan from
DOT's regulations occurred in the Committee's rejection of the re-
quirement of accessibility for all "key stations." While MTA had
designated 255 stations as "key" under DOT standards,3 9 the al-
ternative plan advocated that only 134 stations be considered
"key" and therefore made accessible. The Committee designated
fewer key stations because of the existence of parallel bus service,
the high cost of accessibilty improvements, and comparatively low
ridership in certain key stations.240 Despite the reduced number of
accessible stations, the alternative plan concluded that effective
service would nevertheless result if the key stations were used in
combination with accessible bus service. 41
INC., SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL SURVEY OF TRANSPORTATION HANDICAPPED PEOPLE
(1978)).
237. Operator's Comments, supra note 207, at 45.
238. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 4.
239. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 88. See definition of "key station" in note 222
supra.
240. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 4. In arriving at the lower figure, the Commit-
tee rejected only one of DOT's criteria for determining key stations, namely, stations where
passenger boardings exceed average stations boardings by 15%. Such stations were all lo-
cated in Manhattan where the subway routes are duplicated by'bus routes. Interview with
James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n, in New York City (Mar. 10,
1981).
241. Id. at 5-6. The plan further concluded that accessibility to transportation at these
key stations be achieved at the rate of four per year over the next 30 years. Id. at 3. This, in
the Committee's view, would satisfy the "steady progress" requirement of the DOT regula-
tions. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(4) (1980).
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As for the accessibility of the rapid transit vehicles themselves,
the alternative plan rejected MTA's specifications of back-up ele-
vators, gapfillers and wheelchair tiebacks because none were re-
quired by DOT regulations.2 42 The plan, however, did recommend
that tiebacks be installed in newly purchased vehicles. " Finally,
the success of the alternative plan hinged on the development of
accessible connector service, required by DOT regulations between
accessible and inaccessible subway stations. DOT specified that
"connector service, when combined with the key stations, must
provide a level of service reasonably comparable to that provided
for a non-handicapped person.""' Both MTA"'4 and the Commit-
tee248 proposed to accomplish this by means of accessible fixed
route buses. The Committee recommended further that, until ac-
cessible transportation is achieved, interim accessible transporta-
tion as required by DOT'4 7 be extended through accessible fixed
route buses, paratransit service, and existing specialized transpor-
tation provided by third parties.2' Thus, the Committee recom-
mended that accessibility of New York City's mass transit system
242. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 5-6. The plan misstated DOT regulations when
it commented: "The period of compliance for the subway system is 30 years; subway cars are
replaced every 35 years. The . . .Committee maintains that no subway vehicles should be
retrofitted with wheelchair tie-down devices." Id. at 6. In fact, DOT regulations require a
five year deadline for retrofitting rapid rail vehicles. The 30 year figure refers to an exten-
sion granted for existing fixed facilities. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(4) (1980).
243. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 6.
244. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(3) (1980).
245, Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 31.
246, Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 6. In addition, the Committee recommended
the system occasionally be supplemented by paratransit vehicles. MTA presently has 4,560
buses. Transition Plan, supra note 236 at 64. Relying on this figure, the Committee recom-
mended that 2,280 buses be made accessible. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 9. DOT,
however, requires half the number of peak hour buses to be accessible. 49 C.F.R. §
27.85(a)(ii) (1980). Projecting a peak hour fleet of 3,420 buses, the MTA, by contrast, recom-
mended 3,576 buses be made accessible by 1990, thus far exceeding DOT requirements.
Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 66.
247. 49 C.F.R. § 27.97 (1980). DOT requires interim accessible transportation if the re-
quirements for program accessibilty are not met within three years of the effective date of
the regulations (that is, by July 1982). Id. § 27.97(a)-(b). Until accessibility is achieved, the
recipient is obliged to spend on interim accessible transportation two percent of its financial
assistance under § 5 of the UMT Act. Id. § 27.97(b)(2). In fiscal year 1980, this two percent
figure amounted to some $4.33 million in the New York urban region. Transition Plan,
supra note 3, at 37.
248. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 3-4. The MTA's interim plan calls for similar
services. Transition Plan, supra note 3, at 37.
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be achieved primarily through changes on fixed route buses and
certain strategic subway stations, " 9 rather than by retrofitting all
key stations as required by DOT. 5 0 Because it recommended flex-
ibility in meeting the transportation needs of the handicapped, it
estimated the capital cost at the comparatively low figure of
$13.754 billion per year over the thirty year transition period.2"
Although the Committee felt it necessary to liberalize some of
DOT's rules - in essence, creating a local option, many of the
handicapped groups which comprised the Committee viewed Con-
gressional efforts to change section 504 regulations to permit in-
creased paratransit systems with apprehension. 2  Indeed, they felt
that such unilateral changes would weaken the rules unnecessarily
because most mass transportation systems do not require such ex-
tensive and costly alterations to existing fixed structures.
C. Effects of MTA's Action
When the MTA first announced its decision not to comply with
section 504 rules, federal officials expressed concern that such an
action could serve as incentive for the four other major cities with
non-accessible subways, Chicago, Philadelphia, Cleveland, and
Boston, to take similar action.2 " In fact, the American Public
Transit Association, the national organization of bus and subway
systems, endorsed MTA's refusal and unanimously urged other cit-
ies to follow New York's example,25" though none to date have
done so. MTA subsequently withdrew its refusal to comply and in-
stead took several steps which indicated a softening of its position.
First, it requested a six-month extension in order to reach a com-
249. Alternative Plan, supra note 215, at 3-4.
250. 49 C.F.R. § 27.87(a)(1) (1980).
251. Alternative Plan, supra note 214, at 9. The Committee plan used the Section 321
Report's estimates to approximate the cost of retrofitting the key subway stations. Id. at 8.
The Committee relied on DOT's cost estimates for determining capital improvements to
newly purchased subway cars and buses and increased annual operating and maintenance
costs of $2.131 million once accessibility is achieved. Id. at 8-10. See notes 229-31 supra and
accompanying text for MTA's specifications which exceed DOT's requirements. See text
accompanying notes 207-17 supra for differing scopes of the MTA's and the Citizen Advi-
sory Committee's studies. See also note 241 supra for Committee's misapplication of DOT
regulations.
252. See notes 184-99 supra and accompanying text.
253. N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1980, at Al, col. 4.
254. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, at A33, col. 1.
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promise.2 55 Next, the MTA complied with DOT regulations by sub-
mitting a transition plan by the January 2, 1981, deadline; having
fulfilled this requirement, the transit authority has been granted a
six-month extension for submission of an alternative to the rail
portion of this plan.256 Finally, the MTA has announced its' inten-
tion to seek a formal waiver of compliance with the DOT regula-
tions rather than forfeit federal assistance.257
Although the MTA has retreated from its initial refusal to com-
ply, its action clearly dramatized to Congress the potential hard-
ships DOT regulations impose on large urban centers such as New
York,2 58 and such a showing could persuade Congress to reject the
regulations which have taken DOT so long to develop. Given the
fiscal policies of the Reagan administration which has advocated
massive budget cuts in the area of transportation, ' accessibility of
mass transportation to the mobility handicapped could be seri-
ously jeopardized.
D. Recourses of the Handicapped in New York City
Presently, handicapped groups in New York have initiated three
accessibility suits against the MTA. Two are class actions260 alleg-
ing that the MTA: 1) failed to develop plans that would allow the
class to use public transportation; 2) failed to implement plans
once approved by federal defendant agencies; 3) ordered an "ex-
traordinarily large" number of inaccessible buses (835) in 1979
with the express purpose of circumventing DOT regulations; 4)
failed to consult with wheelchair users in developing and imple-
menting plans; 5) failed to expend the amount required by federal
255. Id.
256. Letter from Richard Ravitch, MTA Chairman, to Neil Goldschmidt, DOT Secretary
(Dec. 31, 1980), reprinted in Transition Plan, supra note 3. But see note 211 supra.
257. Id.
258. One Congressman who spoke in support of the local option noted:
the Howard substitute offers a viable approach to compliance with section 504. ...
This is of utmost importance to the handicapped residing and visiting, the New York
City metropolitan area because the MTA has already announced that it simply can-
not afford to comply with current law and its future funding is now in jeopardy.
126 CONG. REC. H11954 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Lent).
259. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1981, at A12, col. 3. The Reagan administration has recom-
mended budget cuts of $96 million in 1982 to $1.4 billion by 1986. Id.
260. Disabled In Action v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-1862 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 21, 1980);
Dopico v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-4562 (S.D.N.Y., filed Aug. 7, 1980).
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law;" ' and 6) overstated the amounts actually spent in reports to
federal defendants by misclassifying projects as "special efforts"
when many projects benefitted the public as a whole and provided
no special benefit to wheelchair users.20 Both complaints are
grounded on the DOT regulations implementing section 504, the
UMT Act and the Federal Aid Highway Act,23 and therefore, reso-
lution of the two cases may be delayed due to the uncertain status
of the DOT regulations. Both complaints allege, in addition, viola-
tion of the equal protection and due process clauses of the fifth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution."
Courts, however, have held the protection afforded the handi-
capped under the Constitution to be less extensive than that af-
forded by statute.2  It would therefore be necessary for the two
261. 49 C.F.R. §§ 613.200-.204 app. (1980). Under the DOT "special efforts" require-
ment, localities must spend a minimum of five percent of their section 5 UMT Act alloca-
tion on accessibility projects. MTA reports that this would amount to some $10.8 million
annually. Letter from Robert A. Olmsted, Assistant Director of Planning, MTA, to author
(Nov. 7, 1980). MTA has spent no money to date in fulfillment of this "special effort" re-
quirement. Interview with Robert A. Olmsted, Assistant Director of Planning, MTA, in New
York City (Mar. 4, 1981). The transit authority, however, has developed two plans which it
hopes to implement. The first, is an advance reservation paratransit system with an esti-
mated operational cost of some four million dollars per year. The implementation of this
system has been delayed because the labor unions involved have not yet waived their right
to object to the hiring of non-union workers. Id. The second "special efforts" plan recom-
mended the purchase of 100 fixed route mini-buses. When bids were received, however, the
MTA discovered they were double the estimated cost. Id. MTA decided instead to purchase
200 full-size buses equipped with wheelchair lifts. Id. These buses were part of a large ship-
ment which subsequently was halted due to "structural difficulties" which.resulted in cracks
in the bus frames. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1980, at B1, col. 6.
262. Disabled in Action v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-1862, at 17; Dopico v. Goldschmidt, No.
80-4562, at 15.
263. Disabled in Action v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-1862, at 4; Dopico v. Goldschmidt, No.
80-4562, at 3.
264. Disabled in Action v. Goldschmidt, No. 80-1862, at 4; Dopico v. Goldschmidt, No.
80-4562, at 3.
265. See Vanko v. Finley, 440 F. Supp. 656, 663-64 (N.D. Ohio 1977). Accord, Baker v.
Bell, 630 F.2d 1046, 1050 (5th Cir. 1980). Courts do not regard the handicapped to be a
suspect class thereby requiring a higher level of judicial scrutiny for purposes of equal pro-
tection analysis. The Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that physical disability is a non-
suspect status. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973). Accord, Gurmankin v.
Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982, 992 n.8 (E.D. Pa. 1976), afl'd, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1976).
Commentators have, however, argued with force that the handicapped should be regarded
as a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis:
Discrimination against the handicapped may be a suspect classification. The courts
have found suspect classifications when a particular group involved is saddled with
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cases to succeed on statutory rather than constitutional grounds.
By contrast, a third suit against MTA did not allege a violation
of section 504 or of any other federal law. Filed by the Eastern
Paralyzed Veterans Association,2 " it was based solely on two New
York statutes which bar discrimination against the handicapped in
places of public accomodation: the first, the New York State
Human Rights Law217 and second, a public buildings law.268 The
such disabilities, subjected to a history of such purposeful discrimination, or relegated
to a position of such political weakness as to require special protection. The stigma of
inferiority usually attached to such a classification has been the major determining
factor in designating classifications as suspect. Handicapped groups historically have
been politically weak and fragmented, and handicapped persons have been sitigma-
tized by society with a badge of inferiority. The handicap condition, often congenital
and unalterable, has been analogized to racial classifications which almost always
compel the strict standard of review. Classification of the handicapped, involving a
politically weak group with a congenital or unalterable trait, similarly should undergo
the strictest scrutiny by the courts.
Note, Abroad in the Land: Legal Strategies to Effectuate the Rights of the Physically Dis-
abled, 61 GEo. L.J. 1501, 1504-05 (1973). See also Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treat-
ment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975). Moreover, courts have rejected the
argument that the right of the disabled to travel merits strict scrutiny because this protec-
tion does not apply to intrastate travel. See Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F.
Supp. 825 (D. Col. 1978).
266. Eastern Paralyzed Veterans Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 79-18136
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, filed Sept. 20, 1979).
267. The New York State Human Rights Law provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, being the owner,
lessee, proprietor, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public
accomodation, resort or amusement, because of the. . . disability. . . of any person,
directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny to such person any of the
accommodations, advantages, facilities or privileges thereof. ...
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1980). The statute further defines a "place of
public accommodation" to include "all public conveyances operated on land ...as well as
the stations and terminals thereof. . . ." Id. § 292(9) (McKinney 1972). The New York
Human Rights Law is a broad statute which affords protection against discrimination be-
cause of race, creed, color, natural origin, age, sex, or marital status. Id. The provision bar-
ring discrimination against the handicapped was enacted in 1974. 1974 N.Y. Laws ch. 988.
The law has had wide application. For example, it has been used to establish tort liability
for mental anguish based on unlawful racial discrimination. Batavia Lodge v. New York
State Div. of Human Rights, 35 N.Y.2d 143, 316 N.E.2d 318, 359 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1974).
268. The New York Public Building Law provides:
In addition to any other requirements respecting the construction of a public building
and facilities thereof, the new construction, reconstruction, rehabilitation, alteration
or improvement of all such buildings and facilities shall conform to the requirements
of the state building construction code relating to facilities for the physically handi-
capped, except work already completed, work in progress, or work for which sche-
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second pleading having been preserved for separate consideration,
the trial court in Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Association v. Met-
ropolitan Transportation Association, ruled that the MTA had vi-
olated the Human Rights Law, construing the statute to require
"special efforts."2 69 On appeal, the Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed. The handicappeds' complaint had alleged that
since the effective date of the Human Rights Law, September 1,
1974, the MTA had been purchasing inaccessible buses and con-
structing and reconstructing inaccessible transportation terminals
and stations,'70 all public accommodations within the meaning of
the act. As explained in the plaintiff's brief, the alleged acts "con-
stitute the making of new barriers to the handicapped, which deny
to them the enjoyment of places of public accommodation....
We do not seek special accommodation of their needs - only ac-
cess. . . ."271 Thus, handicapped plaintiffs in this suit did not seek
affirmative action under section 504, but only a cessation of pre-
matic designs have been approved by the effective date of this Act [Sept. 1, 1972].
N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The state building construction code to
which new buildings and alterations must conform requires "at least one path of travel con-
sisting of walks, ramps, lobbies, elevators or passageways . . . that provides free and unob-
structed access to, and exit from the building." N.Y. STATE BUILDING CONSTRUCTION CODE
§ C215-2.1 (1972). The Public Buildings Law defines public buildings to mean "any build-
ing or portion thereof. . . constructed wholly or partially with state or municipal funds...
which is likely to be used by physically handicapped persons, including ... transportation
terminals and stations. . . " N.Y. PUB. BLDGS. LAW § 50(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980). The
statute further defines "reconstruction, rehabilitation, alteration or improvement" to mean
"only that work which results in a substantial change in the structure or facilities of a
public building. .. ..." Id. § 50(6) (emphasis added). Finally, the statute requires the "offi-
cial, governing body or board having design approval authority for state or municipal build-
ing construction [to] determine whether a proposed structure is a 'public building' . . . [as
defined and to] ensure that the design of any such building complies with the require-
ments. . . " Id. § 52. No cases as of this writing have been decided under this statute.
269. Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 103 Misc. 2d 933,
936, 426 N.Y.S.2d 406, 408 (Sup. Ct. 1980), modified, - A.D.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1st Dep't
1980), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 5, col. 2 (lst Dep't Dec. 8, 1980). "Defendants acknowledge
that as early as 1964 it was the avowed policy of the Federal Government to require local
transportation authorities receiving Federal funds to take special efforts in making facilities
accessible to the disabled. . ..What is required is 'special efforts' and defendants have not
demonstrated . . . that any significant effort was being made." 103 Misc. 2d at 935-36, 426
N.Y.S.2d at 408. The trial court, therefore, citing the UMT Act, appeared to be reading
federal requirements into the New York Human Rights Law.
270. Brief for Plaintiffs-Respondents at 4, Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Ass'n v. Metro-
politan Transp. Auth., - A.D.2d _, _ N.Y.S.2d - (1980), N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1980, at 5, col. 2
(1st Dep't Dec. 8, 1980).
271. Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added).
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sent and continuing violations of the state Human Rights Law.27 2
The First Department, however, rejected this argument that the
law barred construction of new barriers, holding that the Human
Rights Law did not require affirmative action. Under the "plain
language" rule, no requirement of "special efforts," as the trial
court had held, existed: "Where the legislature has wished a partic-
ular state agency to take 'affirmative action' on behalf of the dis-
abled or handicapped, it has so stated in unambiguous terms.' 7
By contrast, because the statute's plain definition of "discrimina-
tion" forbids "segregation and separation,'17 4 the New York State
Division of Human Rights in prior administrative rulings had re-
quired retrofitting of even pre-existing structures to accommodate
the handicapped.27
No judicial determination has yet resulted as to the Public
Buildings Law cause of action brought by the Eastern Paralyzed
Veterans.27 " Final rulings on either complaint grounded on New
York law favorable to the handicapped may very well have nation-
wide repercussions in encouraging suits under state anti-discrimi-
nation statutes277 in view of the fact that most states have enacted
272. Id. at 9.
273. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 8, 1980fat 5, col. 2.
274. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 292(19) (McKinney 1972).
275. See State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Sciacca v. Food Fair, Inc., CPD-39878-75
(1979) (pre-existing structure outside supermarket required to be modified because the law
"imposes a duty to make public accommodations accessible to disabled individuals") Id. at
5; State Div. of Human Rights ex rel. Brewer v. Cohen Brothers, GCPD-393572-75 (1978)
(Defendants by maintaining steps denied complainant the privileges of a place of public
accommodation, in violation of the Human Rights Law.). A court generally should show
great deference to the interpretation given a statute by the agency charged with its adminis-
tration. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965).
276. Eastern Paralyzed Veterans' Ass'n v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 79-18136
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County filed Sept. 20, 1979).
277. Interview with James Weisman, Counsel, Eastern Paralyzed Veteran's Ass'n, in
New York City (Mar. 10, 1981). Conversely, it is possible that an unfavorable final ruling in
New York state court could have a devastating effect of judicial precedence on subsequent
suits by the New York City handicapped alleging MTA's violation of section 504. For exam-
ple, in Mitchell v. National Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1977), a former em-
ployee filed an administrative complaint with the New York State Division of Human
Rights alleging violation of the Human Rights Law. Having exhausted her administrative
remedies, appellant sought judicial review in the Appellate Division of the New York State
Supreme Court ruling which affirmed the administrative decision against her. The appellant
then filed suit in federal court, alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), which bars
racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts. The district court held
that the state administrative and judicial proceedings had a res judicata effect barring later
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laws similar to New York's Human Rights Law27 ' and Public
Buildings Law.2 7 e Due to the uncertain status of section 504 and
the futility of alleging claims solely on constitutional grounds, deci-
sions based on state law could contribute significantly to the right
of the handicapped to accessible mass transportation.28 0
action under section 1981, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 553 F.2d at 266-68. The second
claim, however, must present a sufficently similar issue for res judicata to bar a suit. As the
Supreme Court has stated:
[a] right, question or fact distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of
competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery cannot be disputed in a subsequent
suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a
different cause of action, the right, question or fact once so determined must, as be-
tween the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long
as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.
Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897). Accord, Mitchell v. National
Broadcasting Co., 553 F.2d at 268-73. The principle of stare decisis might then extend the
court's adjudication as to the fact of MTA's compliance to bar suits by other plaintiffs. "But
stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a mechanical formula of adherence to the latest
decision, however recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with a
prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder, and verified by experi-
ence." Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
278. For example, California law provides:
Blind persons, visually handicapped persons, deaf persons, and other physically dis-
abled persons shall be entitled to full and equal access, as other members of the gen-
eral public, to accommodations, advantages, facilities, Ad privileges of all common
carriers, airplanes, motor vehicles, railroad trains, motorbuses, street cars, boats or
any other public conveyances or modes of transportation ...
CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1(a) (West Supp. 1981). In language arguably less mandatory in nature,
North Dakota law states: "It is the policy of this state to encourage and enable the blind,
the visually handicapped, and the otherwise physically disabled to participate fully in the
social and economic life of the state and to engage in remunerative employment." N.D.
CENT. CODE § 25-13-01 (1978).
279. Among the states which have enacted public building laws barring discrimination
against the handicapped, New York's is one of the very few which contains no waiver clause
of any kind. See also IowA CODE ANN. § 104A (West Supp. 1981). Most provide for waiver of
accessibility requirements under a variety of circumstances. One of the states allowing espe-
cially broad waivers is Arkansas which stipulates certain buildings should be made acces-
sible "except where such compliance is impractical in the opinion of the enforcing Agency."
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 14-627 (1979). Another such state is Minnesota: "[n]othing ... shall be
construed to require remodeling . . . solely to provide accessibility and usability to the
physcally handicapped when remodeling would not otherwise be undertaken." MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 471.467(2) (West 1977). Other states allow waivers for cost. See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 10-
5-270(b) (Supp. 1980) (where cost of accessibility construction "exceeds seven percent of the
total construction.") and W. VA. CODE § 18-10F-3(3) (1977) (if "compliance therewith would
create financial hardship"). Alabama allows a waiver if "an alternative facility is already
reasonably available." ALA. CODE § 21-4-5(b) (1975). Texas, on the other hand, repealed its
public building accessibility law in 1979. TEx. CIV. CODE ANN. § 678g (Vernon Supp. 1981).
280. Decisions regarding accessibility to mass transportation based on state law should
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VI. Conclusion
During the debates in the closing hours of the 96th Congress,
one congressman described the mass transportation accessibility
problem as requiring a choice:
There are two key words to describe the current controversy. One is the
word, "mainstream," and the the other is "mobility." Do we put in place a
system that mainstreams the handicapped into every vehicle be it light rail,
heavy rail or other transit mode, or, do we provide mobility and make sure
that the system we put in place gives the elderly and handicapped as much
mobility as possible? 8 '
The legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act makes it clear that
Congress intended the handicapped to be integrated into main-
stream society.282 Imposition of such a dichotomy, moreover, runs
afoul of the Federal-Aid Highway Act which requires effective use
of mass transportation for the handicapped - mobility.8s
While section 504's early history was closely tied with the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Congress, courts, and administrative agencies
have increasingly lost sight of the statute's genesis. What began as
a humanitarian gesture to give the handicapped substantive statu-
not, however, affect the right td.bring a private cause of action under section 504 in view of
the fourth requirement of the Cort test. See notes 59, 66 supra and accompanying text.
Accessibility to mass transportation is not an area traditionally relegated to state law. First,
as the legislative history of the UMT Act of 1964 noted: "(m]ass transportation needs have
outstripped the present resources of the cities and States, and a nationwide program can
substantially assist in solving transportation problems." H. REP. No. 204, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess., 4-5, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2569, 2573. Second, the rights
of the handicapped are of national concern. As the legislative history of the 1974 amend-
ment to the Rehabilitation Act states:
The [Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare] recognizes that actions
taken in the last few years in the courts, the State legislatures, at the local level, and
in the Congress have laid the groundwork for substantial change in the lives of indi-
viduals with handicaps. Now more than ever a concerted and in-depth examination
must be made of all aspects of law and public policy which affect individuals with
handicaps.
For all of these reasons, it is of utmost necessity that a national forum be provided
to focus attention on these problems and their solutions.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 20, at 51, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 6401 (empha-
sis added). Furthermore, when state and federal claims have been joined in the same suit,
courts have been reluctant to exercise pendant jurisidiction. See Atlantis Community, Inc.
v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. at 826; United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andres, 409 F. Supp. at 1302.
281. 126 CONG. REC. H11927 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Edgar).
282. See note 103 supra.
283. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
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tory equal protection rights ' has since disintegrated into yet an-
other "symbolic law"285 with practially no enforcement muscle be-
hind it. The Supreme Court's conclusion that affirmative action is
not generally required in a cause of action based exclusively on
section 504286 places an onerous burden on the handicapped.287 If
the Court holds in University of Texas v. Camenisch this term2 88
that no private right of judicial action exists,"" section 504 will be
of limited utility in enforcing the civil rights of the handicapped, 290
especially given the long history of administrative inaction. While
the DOT regulations, governed in part by section 504, specify the
steps which must be taken to make mass transit accessible, federal
fund recipients, the MTA in particular, have evidenced their reluc-
tarice to comply and have been lent an increasingly sympathetic
ear by the federal government. 291 Thus, handicapped groups will
284. As Senator Hubert Humphrey remarked in arguing for section 504, "it is essential
that the rights of these forgotten Americans [the handicapped] to equal protection under
the laws be effectively enforced," quoted in A. Laski, Legal Strategies to Secure Entitle-
ment to Services for Severely Handicapped Persons, VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OF
SEVERELY HANDICAPPED PERSONs 4 (G. Bellamy ed. 1979).
285. See "Crips" Unite, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
286. Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
287. The Supreme Court in Davis ignored its prior holding in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S.
563 (1974), a decision which should have served as precedent for a finding of affirmative
rights for the handicapped suing under section 504. See notes 52-57 supra and accompany-
ing text. See also Atlantis Community, Inc. v. Adams, 453 F. Supp. at 829 ("The plaintiffs
have made a compelling case for their needs for affirmative action to end their isolation and
to give an opportunity to enter into the mainstream of community life.. . . They are denied
opportunities for employment, education, cultural enrichment and the sharing of the society
of others. Isolation has deprived them of identity. .. .")
288. 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3332 (Nov. 4, 1980).
289. Such a finding would contradict the Supreme Court's reasoning in Lau v. Nichols,
414 U.S. 563 (1974). It would also violate the Court's rules set forth in Cort v. Ash. 422 U.S.
66 (1975).
290. The Congressional Budget Office study commented:
If the Congress wishes to offer handicapped persons transportation services that they
can and will use, door-to-door services and specially equipped automobiles appear
most promising. On the other hand, if the Congress views this as a civil rights issue
and decides that all person [sic] must be furnished equal access to existing public
transportation services, the [DOT] Transit Plan goes further than the two [alterna-
tive plans] in ensuring such equality.
CBO Study, supra note 181, at S8152 (emphasis added).
291. The handicapped argue that mass transportation is the most effective way for them
to gain employment and become self-sufficient, thereby reducing costly federal expenditures
such as disability insurance benefits currently funded at some $125 billion per year. N.Y.
Times, Apr. 7, 1981, at B9, col. 1.
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have to be innovative in finding rights conferred by statutes other
than section 504.
Serene K. Nakano
Since this Comment went to press, two cases which were on ap-
peal have been decided. In University of Texas v. Camenisch, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for trial on the merits to de-
termine whether the university should be required to pay for the
sign-language interpreter. 49 U.S.L.W. 4468, 4470 (1981). Al-
though the unanimous Court did not address the merits, Chief
Justice Burger, writing a concurring opinion, noted that the "trial
court must . . . decide whether the federal regulations at issue,
which go beyond the carefully worded nondiscrimination provision
of § 504, exceed the powers of the Department of Health and
Human Services under § 504." Id. at 4471. In a similar vein, the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in American Public Transit
Association v. Lewis, No. 80-1497, held that the DOT regulations
were inconsistent with Southeastern Community College v. Davis
due to the "extremely heavy financial burdens [they impose] on
local transit authorities." No. 80-1497 (slip op. May 26, 1981), re-
versing American Public Transit Association v. Goldschmidt, 485
F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
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